A paraphrasing of Venture Granters concept written for some friends working on an Impact Certificate market system:
The Venture Granters system would be a closed impact certificate market, fractional, with a special currency that seems like it would probably eliminate most losses to speculation. That’s important, as losses to speculation are otherwise potentially large enough that it could undermine the whole concept of an impact cert market and irrecoverably crash it: If there are too many losses, final buyers wont participate, the market wont be made
Venture Granters don’t deal in real money[1], instead dealing in an inflationary currency that translates directly into real money for the worker (taken from the yearly national budget/funding stream) on the first sale of the impact cert. This also solves the issue that there may be no practical way of taking enough taxes to get venture granters’ relative career capitals to quickly line up with the value that they’ve produced for the world, as the uncaptured value produced by public goods, which we’re trying to measure, can easily grow larger than the GDP. With an internal currency, any quantity can just be minted.
(I know that inflationary currencies are scary, a marketplace is always tempted to run out on them and crash them. I get the impression that this is totally answered by the fact that VGs are an altruistic captive market, they neither want to, nor, can abandon the currency. There’s an extent to which they can: They can try to hold their wealth in impact certs rather than marks, but isn’t that just investing? Isn’t that what we want?)
[1]: An aside, can anyone tell me what “real money” actually means? I’m not sure I know.
By “losses to speculation”, I meant the amount you have to pay the speculator that doesn’t make it through to projects. On reflection, I don’t think this is a problem at all: You have no way of just paying the project. If you did, you’re saying you know a way of always beating the impact market, and that your home-team impact investors would always make perfect investments.
They wouldn’t.
The amount you lose to the market is simply the inescapable cost of the market’s insight.
If I’m really going to bite down on the “people who are good at this will be kind people”, then is it really possible for “losses to speculation” to be a bad thing, given that the people catching the losses are so good?
A paraphrasing of Venture Granters concept written for some friends working on an Impact Certificate market system:
The Venture Granters system would be a closed impact certificate market, fractional, with a special currency that seems like it would probably eliminate most losses to speculation.
That’s important, as losses to speculation are otherwise potentially large enough that it could undermine the whole concept of an impact cert market and irrecoverably crash it: If there are too many losses, final buyers wont participate, the market wont be made
Venture Granters don’t deal in real money[1], instead dealing in an inflationary currency that translates directly into real money for the worker (taken from the yearly national budget/funding stream) on the first sale of the impact cert.
This also solves the issue that there may be no practical way of taking enough taxes to get venture granters’ relative career capitals to quickly line up with the value that they’ve produced for the world, as the uncaptured value produced by public goods, which we’re trying to measure, can easily grow larger than the GDP. With an internal currency, any quantity can just be minted.
(I know that inflationary currencies are scary, a marketplace is always tempted to run out on them and crash them. I get the impression that this is totally answered by the fact that VGs are an altruistic captive market, they neither want to, nor, can abandon the currency. There’s an extent to which they can: They can try to hold their wealth in impact certs rather than marks, but isn’t that just investing? Isn’t that what we want?)
[1]: An aside, can anyone tell me what “real money” actually means? I’m not sure I know.
By “losses to speculation”, I meant the amount you have to pay the speculator that doesn’t make it through to projects. On reflection, I don’t think this is a problem at all: You have no way of just paying the project. If you did, you’re saying you know a way of always beating the impact market, and that your home-team impact investors would always make perfect investments.
They wouldn’t.
The amount you lose to the market is simply the inescapable cost of the market’s insight.
If I’m really going to bite down on the “people who are good at this will be kind people”, then is it really possible for “losses to speculation” to be a bad thing, given that the people catching the losses are so good?