This is a thorny problem, and I’m not working in this space. Having thought a bit about the problem and rejected many other possibilities, what I arrived at is this:
day 0, no one has a reputation but n accounts ‘volunteer’ to be judges
Day n, each “judge” has a history log of the (evidence, decision). Automated tools detect a corrupt judge by looking at the log and looking for decisions not justified by the evidence, and then the buyer and the seller agree on a possible list of non-corrupt judges, and a random sampling of them is chosen. (simplest way is to look at a judge making a different decision from another judge, but determining who is “right” when the majority is wrong is a difficult unsolved problem)
There are some difficulties with this, namely that a judge can only make decisions on publicly available information. For example, you could in theory use it to place a bet for an event that will later happen, and these judges vote whether or not your bet is good.
The incentive that the judges have is the longer the history log of correct decisions, the more that judge is “worth” and the larger the fee they will get.
This is a thorny problem, and I’m not working in this space. Having thought a bit about the problem and rejected many other possibilities, what I arrived at is this:
day 0, no one has a reputation but n accounts ‘volunteer’ to be judges
Day n, each “judge” has a history log of the (evidence, decision). Automated tools detect a corrupt judge by looking at the log and looking for decisions not justified by the evidence, and then the buyer and the seller agree on a possible list of non-corrupt judges, and a random sampling of them is chosen. (simplest way is to look at a judge making a different decision from another judge, but determining who is “right” when the majority is wrong is a difficult unsolved problem)
There are some difficulties with this, namely that a judge can only make decisions on publicly available information. For example, you could in theory use it to place a bet for an event that will later happen, and these judges vote whether or not your bet is good.
The incentive that the judges have is the longer the history log of correct decisions, the more that judge is “worth” and the larger the fee they will get.