Asking whether a thermostat is intentions intrinsically, or whether we only ascribe intentions to them, is what I meant by asking about the phenomenological status of these intentions. If I ask whether Jim really has intentions, or whether Jim is a zombie whom I am merely ascribing intentions to, I’m really asking (I think) whether Jim has free will. If morality is just about doing the right thing, then we don’t need to ask that.
The free will question may still be interesting and important; but I’d like to separate it from the question of what actions are moral. I want there to be only one fundamental moral question: What is the right set of values? The “morality requires free will” viewpoint introduces an entirely different question, which I think should be its own thing.
Asking whether a thermostat is intentions intrinsically, or whether we only ascribe intentions to them, is what I meant by asking about the phenomenological status of these intentions. If I ask whether Jim really has intentions, or whether Jim is a zombie whom I am merely ascribing intentions to, I’m really asking (I think) whether Jim has free will. If morality is just about doing the right thing, then we don’t need to ask that.
The free will question may still be interesting and important; but I’d like to separate it from the question of what actions are moral. I want there to be only one fundamental moral question: What is the right set of values? The “morality requires free will” viewpoint introduces an entirely different question, which I think should be its own thing.