The relevance of that link isn’t lost on me, but it’s not obvious to me that lukeprog’s question is equivalent to “why does objectification offend people?”
I think you can get on fine just knowing the answer to the question “how to tell if something will offend someone?”, and avoid cluttering your mind with irrelevant stuff like “objectification” and “the criterion of violability”.
Well, the status hypothesis easily explains why the Playboy photo will displease many women in a way the mud photo won’t. Do you have any other puzzling questions?
Well, the status hypothesis easily explains why the Playboy photo will displease many women in a way the mud photo won’t.
It gives an answer, but it doesn’t necessarily give complete answer, or at least not a complete answer in relation to the reference class ‘feminists’.
Lowered status is not just bad in and of itself. It also has other effects—making a certain reference class be considered less desirable for certain jobs or social positions, making a certain reference class be less likely to have their complaints or observations taken seriously, making it more likely that a certain reference class will not have their rights upheld or their needs taken into account when laws are passed, and so on. Feminists and other activists—at least the ones that I’m aware of—tend to focus much more on those kinds of issues, some of which are life-threatening, than on the simple emotional discomfort of being offended.
I know very well that status isn’t about “simple emotional discomfort”! Did anyone ever say that it was? Status is up there with money and health among the most important stats of every human being, a huge factor in pretty much everything. Which makes it an even better idea to “follow the money” or “follow the status” whenever you see two parties arguing over something that doesn’t look like a factual issue. Even when you yourself are one of the parties.
The comment I replied to doesn’t make that clear, and can fairly easily be interpreted as ‘they’re just complaining because they feel offended; there’s no reason to take them seriously, it’s just status’. That’s not the only possible interpretation, obviously, but it’s the one I was speaking to. I’m glad that it’s not what you intended.
(Sorry for deleting my previous reply, it missed the mark.)
I wasn’t trying to answer the question “why is objectification wrong”, but rather “why do many people think objectification is wrong?” I think offense is a big part of the answer to the latter. See Righting a Wrong Question. This trick seems to be be especially useful with moral questions, e.g. “why is it wrong to kill” leads to making up stuff like unalienable rights, while “why do people think it’s wrong to kill” leads to evolutionary psychology and other issues that at least have the potential of becoming scientific.
Agreed with this as far as it goes, but I think it can go further.
A real understanding of the status issues involved does more than answer “will people be offended by objectification?” It also answers “does objectification harm people?”
This isn’t a moral question. That is, whether it’s wrong to harm people or not, and in what ways and under what circumstances it’s wrong, is a different question.
A real understanding of the status issues involved does more than answer “will people be offended by objectification?” It also answers “does objectification harm people?”
Yes! Thanks a lot for pointing this out, it makes the picture even more complete.
No, but statements like “X will show such-and-such reaction to Y” are observer-independent, while statements like “X should do Y” are observer-dependent. I enjoy LW more when it sticks to the former kind. I hope to never see the day when the “Wrong” in “Less Wrong” shifts its meaning to “morally wrong according to a certain theory of right and wrong”. Of course others may not necessarily share my taste for talking about true/false instead of good/bad, but talking about true/false also seems to be more useful and less fallacy-laden.
Doesn’t it seem likely that the algorithm for determining whether something will offend someone will contain a reference to objectification or something related to it pretty closely?
Just because you can conceptually draw a larger box around something doesn’t mean it hasn’t got parts.
Doesn’t it seem likely that the algorithm for determining whether something will offend someone will contain a reference to objectification or something related to it pretty closely?
Such an algorithm probably wouldn’t work for people from past epochs, who had a concept of offense quite similar to ours, but didn’t have a concept of objectification. And it wouldn’t work very well even today in my home country (Russia). Linking offense to status seems more robust to me.
I think you can get on fine just knowing the answer to the question “how to tell if something will offend someone?”, and avoid cluttering your mind with irrelevant stuff like “objectification” and “the criterion of violability”.
cousin_it,
Apparently, lots of people think objectification is relevant. I’m asking “Why?”
And no, I’m not asking about offense.
Well, the status hypothesis easily explains why the Playboy photo will displease many women in a way the mud photo won’t. Do you have any other puzzling questions?
It gives an answer, but it doesn’t necessarily give complete answer, or at least not a complete answer in relation to the reference class ‘feminists’.
Lowered status is not just bad in and of itself. It also has other effects—making a certain reference class be considered less desirable for certain jobs or social positions, making a certain reference class be less likely to have their complaints or observations taken seriously, making it more likely that a certain reference class will not have their rights upheld or their needs taken into account when laws are passed, and so on. Feminists and other activists—at least the ones that I’m aware of—tend to focus much more on those kinds of issues, some of which are life-threatening, than on the simple emotional discomfort of being offended.
I know very well that status isn’t about “simple emotional discomfort”! Did anyone ever say that it was? Status is up there with money and health among the most important stats of every human being, a huge factor in pretty much everything. Which makes it an even better idea to “follow the money” or “follow the status” whenever you see two parties arguing over something that doesn’t look like a factual issue. Even when you yourself are one of the parties.
The comment I replied to doesn’t make that clear, and can fairly easily be interpreted as ‘they’re just complaining because they feel offended; there’s no reason to take them seriously, it’s just status’. That’s not the only possible interpretation, obviously, but it’s the one I was speaking to. I’m glad that it’s not what you intended.
Do you think that accurate predictions of people’s behavior is most of what’s required from a theory of right and wrong?
(Sorry for deleting my previous reply, it missed the mark.)
I wasn’t trying to answer the question “why is objectification wrong”, but rather “why do many people think objectification is wrong?” I think offense is a big part of the answer to the latter. See Righting a Wrong Question. This trick seems to be be especially useful with moral questions, e.g. “why is it wrong to kill” leads to making up stuff like unalienable rights, while “why do people think it’s wrong to kill” leads to evolutionary psychology and other issues that at least have the potential of becoming scientific.
Agreed with this as far as it goes, but I think it can go further.
A real understanding of the status issues involved does more than answer “will people be offended by objectification?” It also answers “does objectification harm people?”
This isn’t a moral question. That is, whether it’s wrong to harm people or not, and in what ways and under what circumstances it’s wrong, is a different question.
Yes! Thanks a lot for pointing this out, it makes the picture even more complete.
No, but statements like “X will show such-and-such reaction to Y” are observer-independent, while statements like “X should do Y” are observer-dependent. I enjoy LW more when it sticks to the former kind. I hope to never see the day when the “Wrong” in “Less Wrong” shifts its meaning to “morally wrong according to a certain theory of right and wrong”. Of course others may not necessarily share my taste for talking about true/false instead of good/bad, but talking about true/false also seems to be more useful and less fallacy-laden.
Doesn’t it seem likely that the algorithm for determining whether something will offend someone will contain a reference to objectification or something related to it pretty closely?
Just because you can conceptually draw a larger box around something doesn’t mean it hasn’t got parts.
Such an algorithm probably wouldn’t work for people from past epochs, who had a concept of offense quite similar to ours, but didn’t have a concept of objectification. And it wouldn’t work very well even today in my home country (Russia). Linking offense to status seems more robust to me.