I believe zero people have solved it, and the number remains zero after Graziano’s paper. The hard problem is why there is such a thing as experience, and how there could possibly be any such thing, when everything else we know seems to leave no room for it; yet we have it. Graziano substitutes the question of why we think we have it; but that thinking is itself an experience left unexplained. It does not so much dissolve the problem as ignore it.
I failed to find anything resembling a solution, or a dissolution, that is any better or clearer than this Scott Aaronson’s post on the “pretty hard problem of consciousness.” I may have missed something, that’s why I asked.
There are significant differences between IIT and AST (and Aaronson doesn’t go much beyond refuting IIT).
IIT and AST both start (or argue) from first principles—information processing. But differently:
IIT is self-contained and refers to the amount of information processing
AST related the information processing directly to processes about attention and the information in reports about consciousness.
AST has a neuropsychological plausibility, and processing can be located in specific brain regions. IIT does almost no such thing.
AST makes testable predictions about consciousness. IIT can only be tested on the plausibility of the information processing (though that you can do that is better than most other theories of consciousness).
I scanned through the article in search of a new insight, and came up empty. What did you get from it?
Few people have solved the hard problem of consciousness in a so clearly spelled out way. Aren’t you happy to see this becoming common knowledge?
I believe zero people have solved it, and the number remains zero after Graziano’s paper. The hard problem is why there is such a thing as experience, and how there could possibly be any such thing, when everything else we know seems to leave no room for it; yet we have it. Graziano substitutes the question of why we think we have it; but that thinking is itself an experience left unexplained. It does not so much dissolve the problem as ignore it.
I failed to find anything resembling a solution, or a dissolution, that is any better or clearer than this Scott Aaronson’s post on the “pretty hard problem of consciousness.” I may have missed something, that’s why I asked.
There are significant differences between IIT and AST (and Aaronson doesn’t go much beyond refuting IIT).
IIT and AST both start (or argue) from first principles—information processing. But differently:
IIT is self-contained and refers to the amount of information processing
AST related the information processing directly to processes about attention and the information in reports about consciousness.
AST has a neuropsychological plausibility, and processing can be located in specific brain regions. IIT does almost no such thing.
AST makes testable predictions about consciousness. IIT can only be tested on the plausibility of the information processing (though that you can do that is better than most other theories of consciousness).