Well, if person A’s religion strictly implies the claim that only God can make a soul and this precludes AI, then the falsehood of that claim also implies the falsehood of A’s religion. (A->B ⇒ -B → -A)
But sure, you’re of course correct that if person A is mistaken about what person A’s religion claims, then no amount of demonstrated falsehoods in person A’s statements necessarily demonstrates falsehood in person A’s religion.
That said… if we don’t expect person A saying “my religion claims X” given that person A’s religion claims X, and we don’t expect person A saying “my religion doesn’t claim X” given that person A’s religion doesn’t claim X, then what experiences should we expect given the inclusion or exclusion of particular claims in person A’s religion?
Because if there aren’t any such experiences, then It seems that this line of reasoning ultimately leads to the conclusion that not only the objects religions assert exist, but the religions themselves, are epiphenomenal.
I think the “strictly implies” may be stealing a base.
Yes, being convinced of the existence of the AI would make the man rethink the aspects of his religion that he believes renders an AI impossible, but he could update that and keep the rest. From his perspective, he’d have the same religion, but updated to account for the belief in AIs.
Well, if person A’s religion strictly implies the claim that only God can make a soul and this precludes AI, then the falsehood of that claim also implies the falsehood of A’s religion. (A->B ⇒ -B → -A)
But sure, you’re of course correct that if person A is mistaken about what person A’s religion claims, then no amount of demonstrated falsehoods in person A’s statements necessarily demonstrates falsehood in person A’s religion.
That said… if we don’t expect person A saying “my religion claims X” given that person A’s religion claims X, and we don’t expect person A saying “my religion doesn’t claim X” given that person A’s religion doesn’t claim X, then what experiences should we expect given the inclusion or exclusion of particular claims in person A’s religion?
Because if there aren’t any such experiences, then It seems that this line of reasoning ultimately leads to the conclusion that not only the objects religions assert exist, but the religions themselves, are epiphenomenal.
I think the “strictly implies” may be stealing a base.
Yes, being convinced of the existence of the AI would make the man rethink the aspects of his religion that he believes renders an AI impossible, but he could update that and keep the rest. From his perspective, he’d have the same religion, but updated to account for the belief in AIs.