People hear: “The universe runs like clockwork; physics is deterministic; the future is fixed.”
The question of whether the future is “fixed” is unimportant, and irrelevant to the debate over free will and determinism. The future—what will happen—is necessarily “fixed”. To say that it isn’t implies that what will happen may not happen, which is logically impossible. The interesting question is not about whether the future is fixed, but rather about what fixes the future.
People hear: “The universe runs like clockwork; physics is deterministic; the future is fixed.”
The question of whether the future is “fixed” is unimportant, and irrelevant to the debate over free will and determinism. The future—what will happen—is necessarily “fixed”. To say that it isn’t implies that what will happen may not happen, which is logically impossible. The interesting question is not about whether the future is fixed, but rather about what fixes the future.