Addendum: The approach I take in “Ex ante sure losses are irrelevant if you never actually occupy the ex ante perspective” has precedent in Hedden (2015)’s defense of “time-slice rationality,” which I highly recommend. Relevant quote:
I am unmoved by the Diachronic Dutch Book Argument, whether for Conditionalization or for Reflection. This is because from the perspective of Time-Slice Rationality, it is question-begging. It is uncontroversial that collections of distinct agents can act in a way that predictably produces a mutually disadvantageous outcome without there being any irrationality. The defender of the Diachronic Dutch Book Argument must assume that this cannot happen with collections of time-slices of the same agent; if a collection of time-slices of the same agent predictably produces a disadvantageous outcome, there is ipso facto something irrational going on. Needless to say, this assumption will not be granted by the defender of Time-Slice Rationality, who thinks that the relationship between time-slices of the same agent is not importantly different, for purposes of rational evaluation, from the relationship between time-slices of distinct agents.
Addendum: The approach I take in “Ex ante sure losses are irrelevant if you never actually occupy the ex ante perspective” has precedent in Hedden (2015)’s defense of “time-slice rationality,” which I highly recommend. Relevant quote: