Curiously, he never uses the word “modernism”, and seems to think his discovery of this historical transition is entirely novel
I would guess that a literature professor does have a conception of “modernism”. Maybe for some reason he doesn’t mean what his collegues mean when they say “modernism”?
If he means something else, he ought to mention the difference. He ought to say that this was a separate transition at about the same time, or that it is modernism, but the distinctive property of modernism is different than people generally think.
One of the more bizarre things about the book is that it sounds like it was written in 1925. His definition of art would lead directly to Gertrude Stein’s “poetry”; his explication of the need to destroy the meanings of words to free the artist is a paraphrase of William Carlos Williams. He mentions Faulkner, Fitzgerald, Diderot, and Derrida, but only in passing (so far). His beliefs about language resembles TS Eliot’s; his defense of it amounts to citing 19th-century French poets and early Wittgenstein. He never mentions that his definition of art and his theory of meaning are the same ones that led to post-modern art, which he never brings up even though the entire book seems to be aimed at discrediting post-modern art. He seems to be backing up to 1925 and trying to give neo-modernist theory a second go, only with Catholic mysticism this time, without citing the neo-modernists or admitting that post-modernism happened. Neither “modernism” nor “post-modernism” appear in the index. (Nothing at all appears in the index except for the names of artists, works of art, and critics, which tells you a lot about how Steiner thinks.)
His section on [modernism] begins, “We are, I believe, at present within a transformative, metamorphic process which began, rather abruptly, in Western Europe and Russia during the 1870s,” and on p. 93 summarizes his discovery by saying, “It is my belief that this contract [that words can describe reality] is broken for the first time, in any thorough and consequent sense, in European, Central European and Russian culture and speculative consciousness during the decades from the 1870s to the 1930s. It is this break of the covenant between word and world which constitutes one of the very few genuine revolutions of spirit in Western history and which defines modernity itself” [emphasis his]. It is a textbook definition of modernism, yet he seems to be claiming it as his own discovery. Elsewhere he vomits references to prior works uncontrollably, yet in this section, while he continues citing at least one pre-1925 source per sentence, he cites no one past that date and gives no hint that anybody else has ever noticed this phenomenon.
His take on modernism is that it is the death of logocentrism. This is a common thing to say nowadays, and a concise interpretation of modernism. I don’t think he originated that idea, either. It looks from Google like it was used this way by Tillich in 1926, Bergson in 1941, Maurelos in 1964, and Derrida in the 1970s, though I’m only looking at references to their works. Wikipedia says Ludwig Klages invented the term “logocentrism” in the 1920s.
If somebody had written it in 1925, it’d be in the public domain now, and could be legally ripped off.
But that couldn’t actually be relevant, could it? I haven’t read Klages. But if Klages or Tillich aren’t being referenced, maybe their writing could be worth a comparison.
Reading further, the argument isn’t what I expected. It’s just 2 steps:
Language doesn’t correspond to reality.
Therefore, whatever meaning we find in language comes from God.
This is presented on pages 93-120. For point 1 he cites Wittgenstein, and for point 2 he cites Derrida, who wrote much later. He may be abusing Derrida, though it’s hard to say what either Derrida or Steiner means by “God”.
I think I understand how Steiner thinks now. He really means it when he says words are a game that doesn’t correspond to reality. He doesn’t argue points because he doesn’t believe his statements have a truth-value corresponding to reality. Advancing a new thesis, to him, is exactly like writing a new novel that references previous novels. You don’t have to ask whether the previous novels were true. You are just taking what they said as the next step in the game. That’s why to him, a citation counts the same as a proof, and why he never questions whether the sources he cite are correct or contradict each other. It is enough for him that someone has said it; it is now part of the game.
I would guess that a literature professor does have a conception of “modernism”. Maybe for some reason he doesn’t mean what his collegues mean when they say “modernism”?
If he means something else, he ought to mention the difference. He ought to say that this was a separate transition at about the same time, or that it is modernism, but the distinctive property of modernism is different than people generally think.
One of the more bizarre things about the book is that it sounds like it was written in 1925. His definition of art would lead directly to Gertrude Stein’s “poetry”; his explication of the need to destroy the meanings of words to free the artist is a paraphrase of William Carlos Williams. He mentions Faulkner, Fitzgerald, Diderot, and Derrida, but only in passing (so far). His beliefs about language resembles TS Eliot’s; his defense of it amounts to citing 19th-century French poets and early Wittgenstein. He never mentions that his definition of art and his theory of meaning are the same ones that led to post-modern art, which he never brings up even though the entire book seems to be aimed at discrediting post-modern art. He seems to be backing up to 1925 and trying to give neo-modernist theory a second go, only with Catholic mysticism this time, without citing the neo-modernists or admitting that post-modernism happened. Neither “modernism” nor “post-modernism” appear in the index. (Nothing at all appears in the index except for the names of artists, works of art, and critics, which tells you a lot about how Steiner thinks.)
His section on [modernism] begins, “We are, I believe, at present within a transformative, metamorphic process which began, rather abruptly, in Western Europe and Russia during the 1870s,” and on p. 93 summarizes his discovery by saying, “It is my belief that this contract [that words can describe reality] is broken for the first time, in any thorough and consequent sense, in European, Central European and Russian culture and speculative consciousness during the decades from the 1870s to the 1930s. It is this break of the covenant between word and world which constitutes one of the very few genuine revolutions of spirit in Western history and which defines modernity itself” [emphasis his]. It is a textbook definition of modernism, yet he seems to be claiming it as his own discovery. Elsewhere he vomits references to prior works uncontrollably, yet in this section, while he continues citing at least one pre-1925 source per sentence, he cites no one past that date and gives no hint that anybody else has ever noticed this phenomenon.
His take on modernism is that it is the death of logocentrism. This is a common thing to say nowadays, and a concise interpretation of modernism. I don’t think he originated that idea, either. It looks from Google like it was used this way by Tillich in 1926, Bergson in 1941, Maurelos in 1964, and Derrida in the 1970s, though I’m only looking at references to their works. Wikipedia says Ludwig Klages invented the term “logocentrism” in the 1920s.
If somebody had written it in 1925, it’d be in the public domain now, and could be legally ripped off.
But that couldn’t actually be relevant, could it? I haven’t read Klages. But if Klages or Tillich aren’t being referenced, maybe their writing could be worth a comparison.
Reading further, the argument isn’t what I expected. It’s just 2 steps:
Language doesn’t correspond to reality.
Therefore, whatever meaning we find in language comes from God.
This is presented on pages 93-120. For point 1 he cites Wittgenstein, and for point 2 he cites Derrida, who wrote much later. He may be abusing Derrida, though it’s hard to say what either Derrida or Steiner means by “God”.
I think I understand how Steiner thinks now. He really means it when he says words are a game that doesn’t correspond to reality. He doesn’t argue points because he doesn’t believe his statements have a truth-value corresponding to reality. Advancing a new thesis, to him, is exactly like writing a new novel that references previous novels. You don’t have to ask whether the previous novels were true. You are just taking what they said as the next step in the game. That’s why to him, a citation counts the same as a proof, and why he never questions whether the sources he cite are correct or contradict each other. It is enough for him that someone has said it; it is now part of the game.