So the mistake that I think is inherent in Pascal’s Wager is the assumption that there is some outcome (heaven, existence, whatever) that is infinitely good.
Why is this mistaken?
Well, for heaven to be infinitely good, it must be the case that you value a 1/N probability of heaven more than you value a certainty of some extremely good outcome (like becoming a billionaire, curing all disease in the world, etc), for any N, no matter how large. Even N=Graham’s number.
Now there are good scientific reasons to think that heaven couldn’t really be “that good”. For example, there is a limit to how long you can exist without going into a cycle (Poincare Recurrance Theorem), a limit to how much joy you can feel (limited response of neurons) etc.
But even if you stipulated that your utility is infinite for a state that is only finitely good in the usual sense (this is perfectly logically consistent, it’s just mad), you still run into problems.
A reasoning system that has infinite utilities would sacrifice any finite possession for even a minuscule increase in the probability of the infinite utility outcome.
For example, if one read the bible with the assumption that getting into heaven is infinitely good, one would try to find the most likely interpretation of every rule and follow it exactly. Someone actually tried to do this—see A year of living biblically. The result of actually trying to follow those rules exactly would inevitably be Jail. But an idealized reasoning system that assigned an infinite utility to heaven would recommend that Jail in this life is a small sacrifice to make for infinite utility.
It seems extremely unlikely that you would actually act on the stated preference of infinite utility for heaven.
The bigger problem is that accepting Pascal wager is just first step on the road to faith. And walking the road means to live and pray as if you had faith.
So the mistake that I think is inherent in Pascal’s Wager is the assumption that there is some outcome (heaven, existence, whatever) that is infinitely good.
Why is this mistaken?
Well, for heaven to be infinitely good, it must be the case that you value a 1/N probability of heaven more than you value a certainty of some extremely good outcome (like becoming a billionaire, curing all disease in the world, etc), for any N, no matter how large. Even N=Graham’s number.
Now there are good scientific reasons to think that heaven couldn’t really be “that good”. For example, there is a limit to how long you can exist without going into a cycle (Poincare Recurrance Theorem), a limit to how much joy you can feel (limited response of neurons) etc.
But even if you stipulated that your utility is infinite for a state that is only finitely good in the usual sense (this is perfectly logically consistent, it’s just mad), you still run into problems.
A reasoning system that has infinite utilities would sacrifice any finite possession for even a minuscule increase in the probability of the infinite utility outcome.
For example, if one read the bible with the assumption that getting into heaven is infinitely good, one would try to find the most likely interpretation of every rule and follow it exactly. Someone actually tried to do this—see A year of living biblically. The result of actually trying to follow those rules exactly would inevitably be Jail. But an idealized reasoning system that assigned an infinite utility to heaven would recommend that Jail in this life is a small sacrifice to make for infinite utility.
It seems extremely unlikely that you would actually act on the stated preference of infinite utility for heaven.
The bigger problem is that accepting Pascal wager is just first step on the road to faith. And walking the road means to live and pray as if you had faith.
Somewhat, I do not see this guy doing it...