It is less core than the height example but not nonsensical or irrelevant.
OrphanWilde’s point was that possessing advantages leads people to expect that you will deploy those advantages in their favor. When a man approaches a woman for sex, in what sense is he asking her to deploy her advantage in being able to find casual sex partners?
If a randomly selected male and a randomly selected female have casual sex the direction in which this is most likely to be considered a favour is from the male to the female. See the direction payment usually goes in prostitution for example, or the way sex-for-influence tends to work in general. If the advantage went in the other direction then it would not result in men seeking sex from women in the same way. The men in question are seeking favours because of the way the advantage works. This makes the advice provided relevant.
Develop and follow a strategy for dealing with this as rapidly as possible
If a randomly selected male and a randomly selected female have casual sex the direction in which this is most likely to be considered a favour is from the male to the female.
Maybe this is true, but the (overwhelmingly, I think) most likely situation is that it is not considered a favor at all, in either direction. In most cases, casual sex just isn’t seen as a favor. I’m not a woman and I may be wrong about this, but I really doubt that many women are inclined to agree to casual sex out of a sense of obligation or altruism.
This makes the advice provided relevant.
The general advice of developing and following a strategy is of course applicable in all four cases, but that’s just because the advice is so general. The reason I brought this whole thing up is because the particular strategy that one should follow will, I think, be importantly different in the casual sex case than in the other three examples. I think a decent strategy for a tall person, say, would be to accede to requests for help if the request doesn’t require you to go significantly out of your way or put you at risk of significant harm. The same strategy would work for the strong person and the smart person. But it most emphatically would not be good advice for how a woman should deal with sexual propositions.
Many people (including me) feel that people with certain advantages do have an obligation to deploy that advantage for the benefit of others in certain cases. I think a tall guy who had a policy of refusing to ever help someone reach stuff unless there was something in it for him would be a dick. I do not think a woman who refused to sleep with someone else unless there was something in it for her is a dick. The “advantage” in this case, such as it is, is not obligation-generating in the same way. Seeing that example along with three others where some obligation does exist raised a red flag for me.
If I remember correctly, OrphanWilde is an objectivist, so perhaps his equivocation of the casual sex case with the other three has the opposite motivation—he doesn’t think any obligation exists in any of the examples. From that perspective, perhaps the fourth example doesn’t stick out quite so much, but it is not a common perspective and it isn’t mentioned in his comment, so I didn’t really think of it until I read his reply and recalled who he was. In the absence of that information, I read his comment as indicating a somewhat unsavory attitude towards women’s sexual autonomy. Now I see that my disagreement with him is probably in the opposite direction—in how he thinks about the first three cases rather than the fourth—but I still think the fourth example doesn’t fit.
I think a decent strategy for a tall person, say, would be to accede to requests for help if the request doesn’t require you to go significantly out of your way or put you at risk of significant harm. The same strategy would work for the strong person and the smart person. But it most emphatically would not be good advice for how a woman should deal with sexual propositions.
But having sex with unattractive people does usually “require you to go significantly out of your way or put you at risk of significant harm”, so you don’t need a special case for that.
It’s a continuum: the fraction of times it’s reasonable to pick stuff off shelves for people as a favour is close to 1, the fraction of times it’s reasonable to write Web pages for people as a favour is close to 0.5, and the fraction of times it’s reasonable to have sex with for people as a favour is close to 0.
(And anyway, if I understand correctly what type of people OW is talking about, they feel obligated to reach stuff for shorter people even when they need to go out of their way or risk harm to do so.)
But having sex with unattractive people does usually “require you to go significantly out of your way or put you at risk of significant harm”, so you don’t need a special case for that.
In my experience this (positing a special case when sex is involved even though a special case isn’t needed) is a such a general and epidemic problem in modern american culture that most people don’t notice they’re doing it even when you point it out.
(And anyway, if I understand correctly what type of people OW is talking about, they feel obligated to reach stuff for shorter people even when they need to go out of their way or risk harm to do so.)
I agree with pragmatist in that someone who has an advantage “should” help others that do not, in certain cases, but I don’t think the language of obligations is the right one for this “should”. It is more suitably discussed in the framework of virtue ethics. Part of being “a good person” is helping others who ask this kind of favors of you, within reasonable limits. Refusing consistently to do them is not accurately described as neglecting an obligation, if there haven’t been any promises/contracts, but it is (to use pragmatist’s words) “being a dick”—a character trait it is better not to have.
I don’t understand the question. What’s a moral mechanism? If you are asking for a general moral principle that establishes the obligation, I should point out that I’m a moral particularist. I don’t think that appeal to general principles is essential for sound moral reasoning, and I don’t think there are many true, simple and general moral principles.
It is less core than the height example but not nonsensical or irrelevant.
If a randomly selected male and a randomly selected female have casual sex the direction in which this is most likely to be considered a favour is from the male to the female. See the direction payment usually goes in prostitution for example, or the way sex-for-influence tends to work in general. If the advantage went in the other direction then it would not result in men seeking sex from women in the same way. The men in question are seeking favours because of the way the advantage works. This makes the advice provided relevant.
Maybe this is true, but the (overwhelmingly, I think) most likely situation is that it is not considered a favor at all, in either direction. In most cases, casual sex just isn’t seen as a favor. I’m not a woman and I may be wrong about this, but I really doubt that many women are inclined to agree to casual sex out of a sense of obligation or altruism.
The general advice of developing and following a strategy is of course applicable in all four cases, but that’s just because the advice is so general. The reason I brought this whole thing up is because the particular strategy that one should follow will, I think, be importantly different in the casual sex case than in the other three examples. I think a decent strategy for a tall person, say, would be to accede to requests for help if the request doesn’t require you to go significantly out of your way or put you at risk of significant harm. The same strategy would work for the strong person and the smart person. But it most emphatically would not be good advice for how a woman should deal with sexual propositions.
Many people (including me) feel that people with certain advantages do have an obligation to deploy that advantage for the benefit of others in certain cases. I think a tall guy who had a policy of refusing to ever help someone reach stuff unless there was something in it for him would be a dick. I do not think a woman who refused to sleep with someone else unless there was something in it for her is a dick. The “advantage” in this case, such as it is, is not obligation-generating in the same way. Seeing that example along with three others where some obligation does exist raised a red flag for me.
If I remember correctly, OrphanWilde is an objectivist, so perhaps his equivocation of the casual sex case with the other three has the opposite motivation—he doesn’t think any obligation exists in any of the examples. From that perspective, perhaps the fourth example doesn’t stick out quite so much, but it is not a common perspective and it isn’t mentioned in his comment, so I didn’t really think of it until I read his reply and recalled who he was. In the absence of that information, I read his comment as indicating a somewhat unsavory attitude towards women’s sexual autonomy. Now I see that my disagreement with him is probably in the opposite direction—in how he thinks about the first three cases rather than the fourth—but I still think the fourth example doesn’t fit.
But having sex with unattractive people does usually “require you to go significantly out of your way or put you at risk of significant harm”, so you don’t need a special case for that.
It’s a continuum: the fraction of times it’s reasonable to pick stuff off shelves for people as a favour is close to 1, the fraction of times it’s reasonable to write Web pages for people as a favour is close to 0.5, and the fraction of times it’s reasonable to have sex with for people as a favour is close to 0.
(And anyway, if I understand correctly what type of people OW is talking about, they feel obligated to reach stuff for shorter people even when they need to go out of their way or risk harm to do so.)
In my experience this (positing a special case when sex is involved even though a special case isn’t needed) is a such a general and epidemic problem in modern american culture that most people don’t notice they’re doing it even when you point it out.
Exactly.
What moral mechanism generates the obligation?
I agree with pragmatist in that someone who has an advantage “should” help others that do not, in certain cases, but I don’t think the language of obligations is the right one for this “should”. It is more suitably discussed in the framework of virtue ethics. Part of being “a good person” is helping others who ask this kind of favors of you, within reasonable limits. Refusing consistently to do them is not accurately described as neglecting an obligation, if there haven’t been any promises/contracts, but it is (to use pragmatist’s words) “being a dick”—a character trait it is better not to have.
I don’t understand the question. What’s a moral mechanism? If you are asking for a general moral principle that establishes the obligation, I should point out that I’m a moral particularist. I don’t think that appeal to general principles is essential for sound moral reasoning, and I don’t think there are many true, simple and general moral principles.
But surely you recognize that the cases share internal similarities even if you want to distinguish them?
I agree that they share certain internal similarities, but not along the particular moral dimension you seem to be talking about here.