When Eliezer and others talk about “civilizational inadequacy”, they generally refer to something much broader than the United States. Eliezer mentions the example of Japan’s monetary policy, for instance. He also contrasts the civilizational inadequacy thesis with “the view that in general, on most issues, the average opinion of humanity will be a better and less biased guide to the truth than my own judgment.” (emphasis added) And he relies (I think) on that thesis to draw conclusions about how he expects humanity to handle AI risk; such an inference wouldn’t work if the thesis was restricted to the prevailing culture or institutions of a particular country. At the very least, if usage deviates from this established meaning I think this should be made clear.
When Eliezer and others talk about “civilizational inadequacy”, they generally refer to something much broader than the United States. Eliezer mentions the example of Japan’s monetary policy, for instance. He also contrasts the civilizational inadequacy thesis with “the view that in general, on most issues, the average opinion of humanity will be a better and less biased guide to the truth than my own judgment.” (emphasis added) And he relies (I think) on that thesis to draw conclusions about how he expects humanity to handle AI risk; such an inference wouldn’t work if the thesis was restricted to the prevailing culture or institutions of a particular country. At the very least, if usage deviates from this established meaning I think this should be made clear.