Using Amazon’s “Search Inside the Book” feature, I found some discussion of abortion (along with birth control) on page 209 of Haidt’s The Happiness Hypothesis. I wonder if that book is working with an earlier version of his theory, because he talks very explicitly about the importance of autonomy to liberals on those pages.
I haven’t read The Happiness Hypothesis, but I’ve just read these pages on Amazon’s preview. It seems to me that this was indeed an earlier phase of Haidt’s thought, when he advocated a much more simplistic theory of the moral foundations and was still a partisan liberal. (I’m not just throwing around an ideological label here—these days Haidt indeed describes himself as a “partisan liberal” in past tense.)
In these cited pages, Haidt gives some clearly biased and unrealistic statements. For example, we are told that “On issue after issue, liberals want to maximize autonomy by removing limits, barriers, and restrictions.” But obviously, you only need to ask a libertarian for his opinion about this claim to realize that in fact “removing limits, barriers, and restrictions” applies only to a strictly circumscribed set of issues, and the liberal understanding of autonomy in fact has a more complex basis.
These days Haidt is far above such evident partisan biases, but I think he still hasn’t come around to re-examining the issues of liberal autonomy in the light of his more recent insight, while at the same time he realizes at some level that it’s incompatible even with his current view of the liberal moral foundations. I don’t think he’s avoiding these problematic discussions in a calculated way, so I think he simply has some sort of “ugh field” around these questions and thus fails to address them clearly and openly.
Clearly it’s a very complex topic, but generally speaking, I do believe that Haidt’s recent work is more or less on the right track in this regard.
That said, much of his insight is not very original, and can be found in the work of other, often much older thinkers, some of whom Haidt cites. Haidt’s significance is mainly that he’s trying to pull off a “Nixon in China,” i.e. to leverage his own liberal beliefs and credentials to formulate these insights in a way that’s palatable to liberals, who would be instantly repulsed and incensed by the other authors who have presented them previously. (I’m not very optimistic about his chances, though, especially since he has to dance around some third-rail issues that might destroy his reputation instantly. Similar can be said for other modern authors who delve into social theory based on evolutionary insight, like e.g. Geoffrey Miller.)
Also, I think there are many other crucial pieces of the puzzle that Haidt is still missing completely, so he still strikes me as very naive on some issues. (For example, I don’t know if he’s familiar with the concept of Schelling points, but he definitely fails to recognize them on some issues where they are crucial. He also apparently fails to grasp what virtue ethics is about.)
Using Amazon’s “Search Inside the Book” feature, I found some discussion of abortion (along with birth control) on page 209 of Haidt’s The Happiness Hypothesis. I wonder if that book is working with an earlier version of his theory, because he talks very explicitly about the importance of autonomy to liberals on those pages.
I haven’t read The Happiness Hypothesis, but I’ve just read these pages on Amazon’s preview. It seems to me that this was indeed an earlier phase of Haidt’s thought, when he advocated a much more simplistic theory of the moral foundations and was still a partisan liberal. (I’m not just throwing around an ideological label here—these days Haidt indeed describes himself as a “partisan liberal” in past tense.)
In these cited pages, Haidt gives some clearly biased and unrealistic statements. For example, we are told that “On issue after issue, liberals want to maximize autonomy by removing limits, barriers, and restrictions.” But obviously, you only need to ask a libertarian for his opinion about this claim to realize that in fact “removing limits, barriers, and restrictions” applies only to a strictly circumscribed set of issues, and the liberal understanding of autonomy in fact has a more complex basis.
These days Haidt is far above such evident partisan biases, but I think he still hasn’t come around to re-examining the issues of liberal autonomy in the light of his more recent insight, while at the same time he realizes at some level that it’s incompatible even with his current view of the liberal moral foundations. I don’t think he’s avoiding these problematic discussions in a calculated way, so I think he simply has some sort of “ugh field” around these questions and thus fails to address them clearly and openly.
As an aside: To what degree do you agree with Haidt’s analysis of religion and tradition in relation to human psychology in that interview?
I would very much like to know. Feel free to PM me a one-sentence answer instead of posting, if you wish.
Clearly it’s a very complex topic, but generally speaking, I do believe that Haidt’s recent work is more or less on the right track in this regard.
That said, much of his insight is not very original, and can be found in the work of other, often much older thinkers, some of whom Haidt cites. Haidt’s significance is mainly that he’s trying to pull off a “Nixon in China,” i.e. to leverage his own liberal beliefs and credentials to formulate these insights in a way that’s palatable to liberals, who would be instantly repulsed and incensed by the other authors who have presented them previously. (I’m not very optimistic about his chances, though, especially since he has to dance around some third-rail issues that might destroy his reputation instantly. Similar can be said for other modern authors who delve into social theory based on evolutionary insight, like e.g. Geoffrey Miller.)
Also, I think there are many other crucial pieces of the puzzle that Haidt is still missing completely, so he still strikes me as very naive on some issues. (For example, I don’t know if he’s familiar with the concept of Schelling points, but he definitely fails to recognize them on some issues where they are crucial. He also apparently fails to grasp what virtue ethics is about.)
Given that my view of virtue ethics was considerably influenced by Haidt, I’d be curious to hear how his opinion of it is wrong.
Thank you.