At least some invariantists do tend to look up cognitive evidence, so your argument is not totally correct. You’re probably right overall, but I’m still not sure- the Invariantist tends to argue using Warranted Assertability manuveres that distinguish being warranted in asserting X from believing X.
The most immediate problem for this approach is that it’s not clear how it could work for embedded contexts.
The other is, of course, to spell out the context-independent meaning and explain precisely how pragmatics operates on it. It’s also not clear that this notion of a strong semantics-pragmatics divide with independent and invariant semantic meanings is tenable in general.
At least some invariantists do tend to look up cognitive evidence, so your argument is not totally correct. You’re probably right overall, but I’m still not sure- the Invariantist tends to argue using Warranted Assertability manuveres that distinguish being warranted in asserting X from believing X.
The most immediate problem for this approach is that it’s not clear how it could work for embedded contexts.
The other is, of course, to spell out the context-independent meaning and explain precisely how pragmatics operates on it. It’s also not clear that this notion of a strong semantics-pragmatics divide with independent and invariant semantic meanings is tenable in general.