Qualia are intrinstic; you can’t construct a quale if you had the right set of particles.
I’m pretty sure that’s not what “intrinisc” is supposed to mean. From “The Qualities of Qualia” by David de Leon.
Within philosophy there is a distinction, albeit a
contentious one, between intrinsic and extrinsic
properties. Roughly speaking “extrinsic” seems to
be synonymous with “relational.” The property of
being an uncle, for example, is a property which
depends on (and consists of) a relation to something
else, namely a niece or a nephew. Intrinsic
properties, then, are those which do not depend on
this kind of relation. That qualia are intrinsic means
that their qualitative character can be isolated from
everything else going on in the brain (or elsewhere)
and is not dependent on relations to other mental
states, behaviour or what have you. The idea of the
independence of qualia on any such relation may
well stem from the conceivability of inverted qualia: we can imagine two physically identical brains
having different qualia, or even that qualia are absent from one but not the other.
I’m pretty sure that’s not what “intrinisc” is supposed to mean. From “The Qualities of Qualia” by David de Leon.