I think this is either basic psychology or wrong.¹
For one, Kant seems to be conflating the operation of a concept with its perception:
Since the concept of “unity” must exist for there to be combination (or “conjunction”) in the first place, unity can’t come from combination itself. The whole-ness of unified things must be a product of something beyond combination.
This seems to say that the brain cannot unify things unless it has a concept of combination. However, just as an example, reinforcement learning in AI shows this to be false: unification can happen as a mechanistic consequence of the medium in which experiences are embedded, and an understanding of unification—a perception as a concept—is wholly unnecessary.
Then okay, concepts are generalizations (compressions?) of sense data, and there’s an implied world of which we become cognizant by assuming that the inner structure matches the outer structure. So far, so Simple Idea Of Truth. But then he does the same thing again with “unity”, where he assumes that persistent identity-perception is necessary for judgment. Which I think any consideration of a nematode would disprove: judgment can also happen mechanistically.
I mean, I don’t believe that the self is objectively unified, so Kant’s view would be a problem for me. But I also just think that the model where most mental capabilities are caused by aspects of the medium and nonreflective computation, and consciousness only reacts to them in “hindsight”, seems a lot more convincing to me in light of my pop understanding of neuroscience and introspection of my own mind.
edit: In summary, I think Kant’s model cannot separate, and thus repeatedly mixes up, cognition and consciousness.
¹ Okay, let me be fair: I think this is spectacularly correct and insightful for its time. But I don’t think people who have read the Sequences will get closer to the truth from it.
I think this is either basic psychology or wrong.¹
For one, Kant seems to be conflating the operation of a concept with its perception:
This seems to say that the brain cannot unify things unless it has a concept of combination. However, just as an example, reinforcement learning in AI shows this to be false: unification can happen as a mechanistic consequence of the medium in which experiences are embedded, and an understanding of unification—a perception as a concept—is wholly unnecessary.
Then okay, concepts are generalizations (compressions?) of sense data, and there’s an implied world of which we become cognizant by assuming that the inner structure matches the outer structure. So far, so Simple Idea Of Truth. But then he does the same thing again with “unity”, where he assumes that persistent identity-perception is necessary for judgment. Which I think any consideration of a nematode would disprove: judgment can also happen mechanistically.
I mean, I don’t believe that the self is objectively unified, so Kant’s view would be a problem for me. But I also just think that the model where most mental capabilities are caused by aspects of the medium and nonreflective computation, and consciousness only reacts to them in “hindsight”, seems a lot more convincing to me in light of my pop understanding of neuroscience and introspection of my own mind.
edit: In summary, I think Kant’s model cannot separate, and thus repeatedly mixes up, cognition and consciousness.
¹ Okay, let me be fair: I think this is spectacularly correct and insightful for its time. But I don’t think people who have read the Sequences will get closer to the truth from it.