If you take a confused idea, X. And you take some non-confused math, Y. Then they do not correspond precisely.
No matter how much math you have, you always face problems of considering issues like whether some mathematical objects correspond to some real life things, or not. And you can’t settle those issues with math.
You settle those issues by experiment.
Can’t be done. When you try to set up an experiment you always have to have philosophical theories. For example if you want to measure something, you need a theory about the nature of your measuring device. e.g. you’ll want to come up with some mathematical properties and know if they correspond to the real physical object. So you run into the same problem again.
I’m not sure I see the problem, frankly.
How are theories justified?
How are theories induced? If you say using the solomonoff prior, then are the theories it offers always best? If not, that’s a problem, right? If yes, what’s the argument for that?
If you take a confused idea, X. And you take some non-confused math, Y. Then they do not correspond precisely.
Can’t be done. When you try to set up an experiment you always have to have philosophical theories. For example if you want to measure something, you need a theory about the nature of your measuring device. e.g. you’ll want to come up with some mathematical properties and know if they correspond to the real physical object. So you run into the same problem again.
How are theories justified?
How are theories induced? If you say using the solomonoff prior, then are the theories it offers always best? If not, that’s a problem, right? If yes, what’s the argument for that?