http://yudkowsky.net/rational/bayes has a section on Bayesian epistemology that compares it to Popper’s ideas.
Bayesian epistemology boils down to: use probabilities to represent your confidence in your beliefs, use Bayes’s theorem to update your confidences—and try to choose a sensible prior.
Of course I’ve read that.
It first of all is focussed on Bayes’ theorem without a ton of epistemology.
It second of all does not discuss Popper’s ideas but only nasty myths about them. See the original post here:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/54u/bayesian_epistemology_vs_popper/
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http://yudkowsky.net/rational/bayes has a section on Bayesian epistemology that compares it to Popper’s ideas.
Bayesian epistemology boils down to: use probabilities to represent your confidence in your beliefs, use Bayes’s theorem to update your confidences—and try to choose a sensible prior.
Of course I’ve read that.
It first of all is focussed on Bayes’ theorem without a ton of epistemology.
It second of all does not discuss Popper’s ideas but only nasty myths about them. See the original post here:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/54u/bayesian_epistemology_vs_popper/