We’re fundamentally incapable of making statements about reality without starting on some sort of arbitrary foundation.
And I think describing it as “selectively ignoring” is doing it an injustice. We’re deductively excluding, and it there were some evidence to appear that would contradict that exclusion, those theories would no longer be excluded.
I’m actually have trouble finding a situation in which a fallibilist would accept/reject a proposition, and a Bayesian would do the opposite of the fallibilist. And I don’t mean epistemological disagreements, I mean disagreements of the form “Theory Blah is not false.”
We’re fundamentally incapable of making statements about reality without starting on some sort of arbitrary foundation.
And I think describing it as “selectively ignoring” is doing it an injustice. We’re deductively excluding, and it there were some evidence to appear that would contradict that exclusion, those theories would no longer be excluded.
I’m actually have trouble finding a situation in which a fallibilist would accept/reject a proposition, and a Bayesian would do the opposite of the fallibilist. And I don’t mean epistemological disagreements, I mean disagreements of the form “Theory Blah is not false.”
This is something Popper disputes. He says you can start in the middle, or anywhere. Why can’t that be done?
I was talking about the theories that can’t be deductively excluded b/c they make identical predictions for all available evidence.