Firstly, “the way we actually do X is by Y” is never a valid criticism of a theory saying “the way we should do X is by Z”. (Contemporary philosophers are extremely fond of this mistake, it must be said.) If we’re not using Bayes, then maybe we’re doing it wrong.
Let me go further. The way people with a good track record of finding out true things (for instance, komponisto) actually go about finding out true things is by collecting explanations and criticisms of those explanations, not by computing priors and posteriors.
What would it mean to be doing it wrong? I can only think of: believing a lot of false things. So tell me some false things that I could come to believe by Popperian methods, that I wouldn’t come to believe by Bayesian methods, or even better show me that the converse happens much more rarely.
Secondly, that the fact that we don’t consciously think in terms of numbers doesn’t mean that our brains aren’t running Bayes-like algorithms on a low level not accessible to conscious introspection.
Sure. For instance there’s good evidence that our brains judge what color something is by a Bayesian process. But why should I take advice about epistemology from such an algorithm?
Let me go further. The way people with a good track record of finding out true things (for instance, komponisto) actually go about finding out true things is by collecting explanations and criticisms of those explanations, not by computing priors and posteriors.
What would it mean to be doing it wrong? I can only think of: believing a lot of false things. So tell me some false things that I could come to believe by Popperian methods, that I wouldn’t come to believe by Bayesian methods, or even better show me that the converse happens much more rarely.
Sure. For instance there’s good evidence that our brains judge what color something is by a Bayesian process. But why should I take advice about epistemology from such an algorithm?