Yvain’s position doesn’t seem sane to me, and not just for reasons of preference; attempting to commit suicide will just push most of your experienced moments backwards to regions where you’ve never heard of quantum suicide or where for whatever reason you thought it was a stupid idea.
This doesn’t seem to be a problem that comes from being quantum suicidal but rather from an entirely different kind of anthropic based suicidal insanity. That is, I would not predict that experience as evaluated by Yvain’s model of caring would be perceived this way. It certainly could be but that would be an additional insanity to the one that makes quantum roulette desirable. (No offense to Yvain and his Quantum Suicidal ilk by referring to this as ‘insanity’. I mean only ‘drastically different preferences preferences to my own in an agent similar enough to me that such comparison is meaningful’. In fact, if you’re going to limit your optimisation to tiny amounts of measure then go ahead and exterminate humanity to maximise paperclips for all I care!)
To expand somewhat: Quantum suiciding at (subjective) time t results in you at time t-1 having more measure than you at time t+1 but under default quantum-suicidal preferences these are in no way in competition. Relative measure between past and future selves isn’t any particular issue. There are just various different subjective experiences at t-1, t and t+1, a desire to have each of them as positive-on-average as can be but no particular inclination to trim measure in one part of a timeline to increase it in another. For example, I wouldn’t expect Yvain to (consider it rational to) commit conventional-and-complete suicide whenever it seemed like all his peak experiences are in the past and all that remained in life is to make the most of the remaining dregs.
Here is fine.
This doesn’t seem to be a problem that comes from being quantum suicidal but rather from an entirely different kind of anthropic based suicidal insanity. That is, I would not predict that experience as evaluated by Yvain’s model of caring would be perceived this way. It certainly could be but that would be an additional insanity to the one that makes quantum roulette desirable. (No offense to Yvain and his Quantum Suicidal ilk by referring to this as ‘insanity’. I mean only ‘drastically different preferences preferences to my own in an agent similar enough to me that such comparison is meaningful’. In fact, if you’re going to limit your optimisation to tiny amounts of measure then go ahead and exterminate humanity to maximise paperclips for all I care!)
To expand somewhat: Quantum suiciding at (subjective) time t results in you at time t-1 having more measure than you at time t+1 but under default quantum-suicidal preferences these are in no way in competition. Relative measure between past and future selves isn’t any particular issue. There are just various different subjective experiences at t-1, t and t+1, a desire to have each of them as positive-on-average as can be but no particular inclination to trim measure in one part of a timeline to increase it in another. For example, I wouldn’t expect Yvain to (consider it rational to) commit conventional-and-complete suicide whenever it seemed like all his peak experiences are in the past and all that remained in life is to make the most of the remaining dregs.