A lot of “why” questions in science bottom out at “because the world is like that”.
But you see, by treating the laws of physics as nothing but mental constructs (rather than as a reality with causal power, that is imperfectly approximated by minds), you extend the realm of brute facts rather radically. Under a law-based conception of physical reality, the laws and the initial conditions may be brute facts, but everything else is a consequence of those facts. By denying that there are mind-independent laws at all, all the concrete patterns of physics (from which the existence of the laws is normally inferred) instead become brute facts too.
I think I understand your speculations about an alternative paradigm, e.g. maybe intelligent life can’t exist in worlds that don’t have sufficiently robust patterns, and so the informational compressibility of the world is to be attributed to anthropics rather than to causally ordering principles. But this faces the same problem as the idea that the visible universe arose as a Boltzmann fluctuation, or that you yourself are a Boltzmann brain: the amount of order is far greater than such a hypothesis implies. A universe created in a Boltzmann fluctuation would only need one galaxy or even one star. A hallucinated life experienced by a Boltzmann brain ought to unravel at any moment, as the vacuum of space kills the brain.
The simplest explanation is that some kind of Platonism is real, or more precisely (in philosophical jargon) that “universals” of some kind do exist. One does not need to be a literal Platonist about them. Aristotle’s approach is closer to common sense: universals are always attached to some kind of substance. Philosophers may debate about the right way to think of them, but to remove them outright, because of a philosophical prejudice or blindspot, leads to where you are now.
I was struck by something I read in Bertrand Russell, that some of the peculiarities of Leibniz’s worldview arose because he did not believe in relations, he thought substance and property are the only forms of being. As a result, he didn’t think interaction between substances is possible (since that would be a relation), and instead came up with his odd theory about a universe of monadic substances which are all preprogrammed by God to behave as if they are interacting.
I am not 100% against these radical attempts to do without something basic in ontology, because who knows what creative ideas may arise as a result? But personally I prefer to posit as rich an ontology as possible, so that I will not unnecessarily rule out an explanation that may be right in front of me.
It seems like we are not even close to converging on any kind of shared view. I don’t find the concept of “brute facts” even remotely useful, so I cannot comment on it.
But this faces the same problem as the idea that the visible universe arose as a Boltzmann fluctuation, or that you yourself are a Boltzmann brain: the amount of order is far greater than such a hypothesis implies.
I think Sean Carroll answered this one a few times: the concept of a Boltzmann brain is not cognitively stable (you can’t trust your own thoughts, including that you are a Boltzmann brain). And if you try to make it stable, you have to reconstruct the whole physical universe. You might be saying the same thing? I am not claiming anything different here.
The simplest explanation is that some kind of Platonism is real, or more precisely (in philosophical jargon) that “universals” of some kind do exist.
Like I said in the other reply, I think that those two words are not useful as binaries real/not real, exist/not exist. If you feel that this is non-negotiable to make sense of philosophy of physics or something, I don’t know what to say.
I was struck by something I read in Bertrand Russell, that some of the peculiarities of Leibniz’s worldview arose because he did not believe in relations, he thought substance and property are the only forms of being. As a result, he didn’t think interaction between substances is possible (since that would be a relation), and instead came up with his odd theory about a universe of monadic substances which are all preprogrammed by God to behave as if they are interacting.
Yeah, I think denying relations is going way too far. A relation is definitely a useful idea. It can stay in epistemology rather than in ontology.
I am not 100% against these radical attempts to do without something basic in ontology, because who knows what creative ideas may arise as a result? But personally I prefer to posit as rich an ontology as possible, so that I will not unnecessarily rule out an explanation that may be right in front of me.
Fair, it is foolish to reduce potential avenues of exploration. Maybe, again, we differ where they live, in the world as basic entities or in the mind as our model of making sense of the world.
But you see, by treating the laws of physics as nothing but mental constructs (rather than as a reality with causal power, that is imperfectly approximated by minds), you extend the realm of brute facts rather radically. Under a law-based conception of physical reality, the laws and the initial conditions may be brute facts, but everything else is a consequence of those facts. By denying that there are mind-independent laws at all, all the concrete patterns of physics (from which the existence of the laws is normally inferred) instead become brute facts too.
I think I understand your speculations about an alternative paradigm, e.g. maybe intelligent life can’t exist in worlds that don’t have sufficiently robust patterns, and so the informational compressibility of the world is to be attributed to anthropics rather than to causally ordering principles. But this faces the same problem as the idea that the visible universe arose as a Boltzmann fluctuation, or that you yourself are a Boltzmann brain: the amount of order is far greater than such a hypothesis implies. A universe created in a Boltzmann fluctuation would only need one galaxy or even one star. A hallucinated life experienced by a Boltzmann brain ought to unravel at any moment, as the vacuum of space kills the brain.
The simplest explanation is that some kind of Platonism is real, or more precisely (in philosophical jargon) that “universals” of some kind do exist. One does not need to be a literal Platonist about them. Aristotle’s approach is closer to common sense: universals are always attached to some kind of substance. Philosophers may debate about the right way to think of them, but to remove them outright, because of a philosophical prejudice or blindspot, leads to where you are now.
I was struck by something I read in Bertrand Russell, that some of the peculiarities of Leibniz’s worldview arose because he did not believe in relations, he thought substance and property are the only forms of being. As a result, he didn’t think interaction between substances is possible (since that would be a relation), and instead came up with his odd theory about a universe of monadic substances which are all preprogrammed by God to behave as if they are interacting.
I am not 100% against these radical attempts to do without something basic in ontology, because who knows what creative ideas may arise as a result? But personally I prefer to posit as rich an ontology as possible, so that I will not unnecessarily rule out an explanation that may be right in front of me.
It seems like we are not even close to converging on any kind of shared view. I don’t find the concept of “brute facts” even remotely useful, so I cannot comment on it.
I think Sean Carroll answered this one a few times: the concept of a Boltzmann brain is not cognitively stable (you can’t trust your own thoughts, including that you are a Boltzmann brain). And if you try to make it stable, you have to reconstruct the whole physical universe. You might be saying the same thing? I am not claiming anything different here.
Like I said in the other reply, I think that those two words are not useful as binaries real/not real, exist/not exist. If you feel that this is non-negotiable to make sense of philosophy of physics or something, I don’t know what to say.
Yeah, I think denying relations is going way too far. A relation is definitely a useful idea. It can stay in epistemology rather than in ontology.
Fair, it is foolish to reduce potential avenues of exploration. Maybe, again, we differ where they live, in the world as basic entities or in the mind as our model of making sense of the world.