This reminds me of the difficulty in doing any kind of Harbergerian transfer of domain names in cryptocurrency-related DNS or identity systems: the value to a malicious attacker of a domain name can vastly exceed any amount that the legitimate owner, who creates that value, can afford to pay. An attacker could afford to spend millions of dollars to seize ‘Coinbase.com’ for an hour (so as to MITM accounts+passwords, and thereby steal billions in account balances), while Coinbase itself cannot afford to spend millions per hour securing a domain name. The system operates as designed in transferring the domain name to the user who can extract the most value from the monopoly over the name, but that’s not the same thing as creating social value...
My proposed solution to both your problem and Richard’s, explained further in a separate comment, is that payment and transfer be separated by enough time to vacate amicably, or sue to enjoin transfer.
This reminds me of the difficulty in doing any kind of Harbergerian transfer of domain names in cryptocurrency-related DNS or identity systems: the value to a malicious attacker of a domain name can vastly exceed any amount that the legitimate owner, who creates that value, can afford to pay. An attacker could afford to spend millions of dollars to seize ‘Coinbase.com’ for an hour (so as to MITM accounts+passwords, and thereby steal billions in account balances), while Coinbase itself cannot afford to spend millions per hour securing a domain name. The system operates as designed in transferring the domain name to the user who can extract the most value from the monopoly over the name, but that’s not the same thing as creating social value...
My proposed solution to both your problem and Richard’s, explained further in a separate comment, is that payment and transfer be separated by enough time to vacate amicably, or sue to enjoin transfer.