The chance that you would live to 1000 given many-world is exactly identical to the chance that you would live to 1000 given any other valid interpretation of quantum mechanics. So living to 1000 (or surviving death-traps, etc) is not evidence for against an interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The chances of survival are the same, but the chances of observing one’s own survival are hugely different (1 vs epsilon), so it’d be pretty strong evidence in favor of many-worlds.
If the Copenhagen interpretation was real then Russian Roulette would get you soon enough. But if Many Worlds is true then all other observers see you die with normal frequency, but you perceive your existence continuing 100% of the time (but your head may be bleeding/brains still thinking while splattered on the wall, etc.).
Actually, I’m still trying to wrap my brains around that last part (ha ha). What if you die, but are spontaneously recreated a billion years later, does that count? I can’t figure out a way to tell the difference...
If the Copenhagen interpretation was real then Russian Roulette would get you soon enough.
Only probably. Bullet could quantum tunnel through my head, for example. I don’t know if you understand the original quantum suicide thought experiment very thoroughly.
you perceive your existence continuing 100% of the time (but your head may be bleeding/brains still thinking while splattered on the wall, etc.).
Nope. I have a naturalistic definition of “me”—if my brain is splattered on the wall, that’s the end of that story. But that does not mean quantum immortality can’t satisfy any definition of “me” I choose to use—see quantum tunneling, above.
but you perceive your existence continuing 100% of the time
Do you think that your existence and your perception of your existence are ontologically fundamental things that either are or aren’t, that either continue or don’t continue?
What if the bullet destroys your memories, but not the perception of your existence? Are “you” still continuing?
What if the bullet destroys the pattern of your self-perception, so that you still have your memories, but the way you process thought and memory is sufficiently different that you don’t feel like you’re the same person as you were before the bullet?
The “Quantum Immortality” fallacy depends on treating people’s existence as an ontologically fundamental thing that somehow “continues”, dragging along memory and sense of self-awareness both. And probably your tastes in music and your movie preferences as well, it’s convenient like that.
True. I was thinking about the odds of being miserable, and I think they’re getting overestimated.
After all, just barely hanging on in great pain is a fragile condition. Living in a branch where good anti-aging tech is feasible, and there are many 1000-year old people, means that you’re healthy—much more likely to live to see the next day.
The chance that you would live to 1000 given many-world is exactly identical to the chance that you would live to 1000 given any other valid interpretation of quantum mechanics. So living to 1000 (or surviving death-traps, etc) is not evidence for against an interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The chances of survival are the same, but the chances of observing one’s own survival are hugely different (1 vs epsilon), so it’d be pretty strong evidence in favor of many-worlds.
If the Copenhagen interpretation was real then Russian Roulette would get you soon enough. But if Many Worlds is true then all other observers see you die with normal frequency, but you perceive your existence continuing 100% of the time (but your head may be bleeding/brains still thinking while splattered on the wall, etc.).
Actually, I’m still trying to wrap my brains around that last part (ha ha). What if you die, but are spontaneously recreated a billion years later, does that count? I can’t figure out a way to tell the difference...
Only probably. Bullet could quantum tunnel through my head, for example. I don’t know if you understand the original quantum suicide thought experiment very thoroughly.
Nope. I have a naturalistic definition of “me”—if my brain is splattered on the wall, that’s the end of that story. But that does not mean quantum immortality can’t satisfy any definition of “me” I choose to use—see quantum tunneling, above.
Do you think that your existence and your perception of your existence are ontologically fundamental things that either are or aren’t, that either continue or don’t continue?
What if the bullet destroys your memories, but not the perception of your existence? Are “you” still continuing? What if the bullet destroys the pattern of your self-perception, so that you still have your memories, but the way you process thought and memory is sufficiently different that you don’t feel like you’re the same person as you were before the bullet?
The “Quantum Immortality” fallacy depends on treating people’s existence as an ontologically fundamental thing that somehow “continues”, dragging along memory and sense of self-awareness both. And probably your tastes in music and your movie preferences as well, it’s convenient like that.
Wouldn’t you be more likely to live to be 1000 in universes with anti-aging tech?
Anti-aging tech is also not correlated with interpretation of quantum mechanics.
True. I was thinking about the odds of being miserable, and I think they’re getting overestimated.
After all, just barely hanging on in great pain is a fragile condition. Living in a branch where good anti-aging tech is feasible, and there are many 1000-year old people, means that you’re healthy—much more likely to live to see the next day.
Ah, interesting point.