As an aside, many US teens who took nude photos of themselves and gave them to their boy- or girlfriend have been charged with the high crime of distribution of child porn.
It is scary that that judge is allowed to vote, let alone pass sentences.
The appeal judge wrote in his opinion that one reason he wanted to punish them was that if left alone they might in the future sell their photos to child pornographers to make money.
You know how bad the media is when it reports science? Well, it doesn’t get much better for law, sadly.
The defendant’s appeal claimed that her right of privacy was being violated by this prosecution. An essential part of that is whether she had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The conclusion was she did not: if teens take naked pictures of each other, there’s a meaningful chance that those pictures will be shared with third parties. This same reasoning has been used to break the privacy defense for photographs of prisoner abuse. This doesn’t help her:
In fact, the defendant in this case expressed her concern to law enforcement that her co-defendant might do something disagreeable with the photographs.
The opinion is interesting, though I say that from a law-oriented background. The law being idiotic does not necessarily make the judge idiotic, and there’s at least a very good argument that the majority applied the law correctly. No expectation of privacy, no right to privacy defense.
They may have erred when they ruled this prosecution counts as the “least intrusive method” to uphold state interests, but I just don’t know the case law on that.
You know how bad the media is when it reports science? Well, it doesn’t get much better for law, sadly.
My lament referred explicitly to the “the appeal judge [who] wrote in his opinion that one reason he wanted to punish them was that if left alone they might in the future sell their photos to child pornographers to make money” and so it stands. You haven’t said as much directly, but am I to take it that you do not believe this judge is factual? If so, I rejoice in his absence from reality.
The CNET report was sensationalized, as Psychohistorian pointed out to me in another comment. You can read the judge’s (appellate majority) opinion here.
The appeal was about their right to privacy, and the judge’s opinion that “if left alone they might...” was saying that because they might do this in the future, and because he expected them to do so, they gave up their right to privacy by creating those photos. Because digital photos are so easy to distribute, so they would surely do so someday even if by mistake. So if they use cellphones to take photos, they give up privacy.
...No, it doesn’t sound much better put that way, does it? But it wasn’t the justification for the original conviction; CNET doesn’t link to that opinion.
Even this is a caricature of the actual legal question. In order for a right of privacy to attach (and that’s her argument against the law), you have to have reasonable expectation of privacy. In this context, that means that you have to have a reasonable expectation that no third party will be exposed or involved. The majority concluded that a high school teenager cannot reasonably expect that no one will ever see the naked pictures she takes with her boyfriend and then sends to his hard drive. In fact, the defendant explicitly stated that she was worried her boyfriend might distribute those naked pictures. The decision also states that, in the context of a more mature or serious relationship, privacy would likely have attached, because some expectation would have been reasonable. There’s still plenty of room to disagree with this, but it’s a lot less absurd than people are trying to make it.
As far as the whole decision goes, if you keep in mind that the judges (and, more importantly, the law) see child pornography (even of basically adults) as an evil that is abhorrent to society, and that damages society by its mere existence, the whole decision is a lot more understandable. Whether you agree with that view or not is largely irrelevant; the voting public seems to have made it rather clear that that is their attitude.
Future guilt had nothing to do with it. The question was about whether an expectation was reasonable; an expectation is necessarily about the future. The court concluded that one cannot expect a teenage boy to keep naked pictures of his girlfriend to himself indefinitely. It may be incorrect or unfair, but it isn’t absurd or unreasonable. It certainly isn’t convicting anyone on the basis of future guilt.
It is my understanding that if the court had not made this determination, it might have had to uphold the defense’s claim to right of privacy, and the defendants would have have been acquitted on appeal.
It is worthwhile quoting the entire relevant part of the judge’s opinion, for those who don’t want to spend time reading the source:
First, the decision to take photographs and to keep a record that may be shown to people in the future weighs against a reasonable expectation of privacy. See [....]
So, he equates privacy with deliberate secrecy. That’s not a presumption of privacy. Note that I’m commenting on common reason, not on whatever the relevant case law may be.
Second, the photographs which were taken were shared by the two minors who were involved in the sexual activities. Neither had a reasonable expectation that the other would not show the photos to a third party. Minors who are involved in a sexual relationship, unlike adults who may be involved in a mature committed relationship, have no reasonable expectation that their relationship will continue and that the
photographs will not be shared with others intentionally or unintentionally. One motive for revealing the photos is profit. Unfortunately, the market for child pornography in this country, according to news reports, appears to be flourishing. See, e.g., [....] These 117 sexually explicit photographs would undoubtedly have market value.
(My emphasis.) So, he says that because they are teenagers, their relationship cannot be “mature and committed”, and so we must assume that one of them will in the future hurt the other for money (not even in revenge or somesuch).
In addition, a number of teenagers want to let their friends know of their sexual prowess. Pictures are excellent evidence of an individual’s exploits. A reasonably prudent person would believe that if you put this type of material in a teenager’s hands that, at some point either for profit or bragging rights, the material will be disseminated to other members of the public.
Distribution of these types of photos is likely, especially after the relationship has ended. It is not unreasonable to assume that the immature relationship between the co-defendants would eventually end. The relationship has neither the sanctity of law nor the stability of maturity or length. The subjective belief of these co-defendants that
the photos might not be shared is not dispositive. In fact, the defendant in this case expressed her concern to law enforcement that her co-defendant might do something disagreeable with the photographs.
The mere fact that the defendant may have subjectively believed that the pictures would remain private does not control; it is whether society is willing to recognize an objective expectation.
(My emphasis.) IOW: each of them is capable of harming the other in the future. Because they are teenagers, we assume they will do so. We explicitly disregard their trust in one another; the relevant point is that we, the society, do not trust them. Therefore we will punish both of them proactively by withdrawing their right to privacy.
It is scary that many judges and public prosecutors in different states agree on charging such young people and declaring them guilty. I don’t know the percentage of charges and of convictions out of all proposed cases or reports and accusations made to the police, but the actual count is apparently in the dozens (google tells me).
It is not, however, surprising, considering common (and legal) attitudes to morality, sexuality and young people’s rights in the U.S.
The logic that it is frightening that this man’s decisions have power over us, whether in his capacities as judge or as voter. Hence it is frightening that a great many people in whom we would not entrust our lives also have votes.
Jurors are treated very differently from voters. They are selected so as not to be biased, they can be removed during the trial, they are kept away from outside influences, the evidence they are allowed to hear is very restricted, they are given instructions on how to vote for various charges and it is the judge who determines the actual sentence in response to their decision. If it is deemed that something went wrong (even years after the sentence is handed down), a mistrial may be declared.
More realistically, they’re selected so as to have a bias acceptable to the counsels and the judge, they are kept away from, uh, undesirable influences, they are given the evidence that the counsels & judge think will make them vote appropriately.
The only possible way a jury system could be any good is by being compared with even more horrid alternatives, like a judge-only court. Sort of like democracy.
There’s plenty of countries where democratic rule is good and stable, and it’s not too hard to predict those. Some obvious predictive variables are tradition of rule of law (which you get transitioning out of some dictatorship like Korean, but not some others like Soviet), low economic inequality, and stability of political system.
All happen to be false in case of South Africa. But these also tend to correlate with wellness and stability of any other political system—so democracy might still be the least bad system for South Africa, given such constraints.
It is scary that that judge is allowed to vote, let alone pass sentences.
It is not the fault of the judiciary that the people consistently elect profoundly stupid legislators.
You know how bad the media is when it reports science? Well, it doesn’t get much better for law, sadly.
The defendant’s appeal claimed that her right of privacy was being violated by this prosecution. An essential part of that is whether she had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The conclusion was she did not: if teens take naked pictures of each other, there’s a meaningful chance that those pictures will be shared with third parties. This same reasoning has been used to break the privacy defense for photographs of prisoner abuse. This doesn’t help her:
The opinion is interesting, though I say that from a law-oriented background. The law being idiotic does not necessarily make the judge idiotic, and there’s at least a very good argument that the majority applied the law correctly. No expectation of privacy, no right to privacy defense.
They may have erred when they ruled this prosecution counts as the “least intrusive method” to uphold state interests, but I just don’t know the case law on that.
My lament referred explicitly to the “the appeal judge [who] wrote in his opinion that one reason he wanted to punish them was that if left alone they might in the future sell their photos to child pornographers to make money” and so it stands. You haven’t said as much directly, but am I to take it that you do not believe this judge is factual? If so, I rejoice in his absence from reality.
The CNET report was sensationalized, as Psychohistorian pointed out to me in another comment. You can read the judge’s (appellate majority) opinion here.
The appeal was about their right to privacy, and the judge’s opinion that “if left alone they might...” was saying that because they might do this in the future, and because he expected them to do so, they gave up their right to privacy by creating those photos. Because digital photos are so easy to distribute, so they would surely do so someday even if by mistake. So if they use cellphones to take photos, they give up privacy.
...No, it doesn’t sound much better put that way, does it? But it wasn’t the justification for the original conviction; CNET doesn’t link to that opinion.
Even this is a caricature of the actual legal question. In order for a right of privacy to attach (and that’s her argument against the law), you have to have reasonable expectation of privacy. In this context, that means that you have to have a reasonable expectation that no third party will be exposed or involved. The majority concluded that a high school teenager cannot reasonably expect that no one will ever see the naked pictures she takes with her boyfriend and then sends to his hard drive. In fact, the defendant explicitly stated that she was worried her boyfriend might distribute those naked pictures. The decision also states that, in the context of a more mature or serious relationship, privacy would likely have attached, because some expectation would have been reasonable. There’s still plenty of room to disagree with this, but it’s a lot less absurd than people are trying to make it.
As far as the whole decision goes, if you keep in mind that the judges (and, more importantly, the law) see child pornography (even of basically adults) as an evil that is abhorrent to society, and that damages society by its mere existence, the whole decision is a lot more understandable. Whether you agree with that view or not is largely irrelevant; the voting public seems to have made it rather clear that that is their attitude.
No, it really doesn’t. But I do understand the desire to justify the decision that he had made.
Actually come to think of it that description sounds even more scary. Guilty (in the future) when that the media in question is proven reproducible.
Future guilt had nothing to do with it. The question was about whether an expectation was reasonable; an expectation is necessarily about the future. The court concluded that one cannot expect a teenage boy to keep naked pictures of his girlfriend to himself indefinitely. It may be incorrect or unfair, but it isn’t absurd or unreasonable. It certainly isn’t convicting anyone on the basis of future guilt.
It is my understanding that if the court had not made this determination, it might have had to uphold the defense’s claim to right of privacy, and the defendants would have have been acquitted on appeal.
It is worthwhile quoting the entire relevant part of the judge’s opinion, for those who don’t want to spend time reading the source:
So, he equates privacy with deliberate secrecy. That’s not a presumption of privacy. Note that I’m commenting on common reason, not on whatever the relevant case law may be.
(My emphasis.) So, he says that because they are teenagers, their relationship cannot be “mature and committed”, and so we must assume that one of them will in the future hurt the other for money (not even in revenge or somesuch).
(My emphasis.) IOW: each of them is capable of harming the other in the future. Because they are teenagers, we assume they will do so. We explicitly disregard their trust in one another; the relevant point is that we, the society, do not trust them. Therefore we will punish both of them proactively by withdrawing their right to privacy.
It is scary that many judges and public prosecutors in different states agree on charging such young people and declaring them guilty. I don’t know the percentage of charges and of convictions out of all proposed cases or reports and accusations made to the police, but the actual count is apparently in the dozens (google tells me).
It is not, however, surprising, considering common (and legal) attitudes to morality, sexuality and young people’s rights in the U.S.
Given the context it seems ironic to let them off based off youth. No, I’ll let them off because the crime itself is absurd.
It’s a pity you didn’t extend the logic further.
The logic being that I disapprove of the judge’s ruling and wish to undermine his credibility with mockery?
The logic that it is frightening that this man’s decisions have power over us, whether in his capacities as judge or as voter. Hence it is frightening that a great many people in whom we would not entrust our lives also have votes.
And there’s that whole ‘jury of my peers’ thing that really scares me. Good point (that I really didn’t want to be reminded of.)
Jurors are treated very differently from voters. They are selected so as not to be biased, they can be removed during the trial, they are kept away from outside influences, the evidence they are allowed to hear is very restricted, they are given instructions on how to vote for various charges and it is the judge who determines the actual sentence in response to their decision. If it is deemed that something went wrong (even years after the sentence is handed down), a mistrial may be declared.
More realistically, they’re selected so as to have a bias acceptable to the counsels and the judge, they are kept away from, uh, undesirable influences, they are given the evidence that the counsels & judge think will make them vote appropriately.
The only possible way a jury system could be any good is by being compared with even more horrid alternatives, like a judge-only court. Sort of like democracy.
Good points. I’m reminded of Robin’s Law as No-Bias Theatre.
Old South African government didn’t really “work” for anyone who wasn’t white.
Some black south africans disagree.
Just because the new black government is bad, doesn’t mean the old white government wasn’t bad.
Some government collapses go quite well, others like South Africa and Soviet Union don’t.
Fair enough. The point wasn’t that white rule is good, but that democratic rule is bad.
There’s plenty of countries where democratic rule is good and stable, and it’s not too hard to predict those. Some obvious predictive variables are tradition of rule of law (which you get transitioning out of some dictatorship like Korean, but not some others like Soviet), low economic inequality, and stability of political system.
All happen to be false in case of South Africa. But these also tend to correlate with wellness and stability of any other political system—so democracy might still be the least bad system for South Africa, given such constraints.