The difference is that since blackmail is costly, there is no incentive to blackmail someone who will not give into it, which makes people who won’t give in better off than people who will. On the other hand, there is no incentive for a company to offer free services to someone who refuses to ‘give in’ and pay money.
I think the logic is along the lines of “make the decision which, if the other party knew you were going to make it, would maximise your expected utility”.
Which shows exactly why the rule is not universally applicable—the other party does not, in general, know what decision you’re going to make (though they can predict it to some level of accuracy), and so there’s a cost/benefit situation.
The difference is that since blackmail is costly, there is no incentive to blackmail someone who will not give into it, which makes people who won’t give in better off than people who will. On the other hand, there is no incentive for a company to offer free services to someone who refuses to ‘give in’ and pay money.
I think the logic is along the lines of “make the decision which, if the other party knew you were going to make it, would maximise your expected utility”.
Which shows exactly why the rule is not universally applicable—the other party does not, in general, know what decision you’re going to make (though they can predict it to some level of accuracy), and so there’s a cost/benefit situation.
I am going to try and save my attempted solution ( http://lesswrong.com/lw/39a/unpacking_the_concept_of_blackmail/342c?c=1 ) from being stuck at the bottom of the thread. This might be inappropriate behavior, and if so please inform me.