Reducing the problem to a smaller problem, or another, already-existing problem, in a way that seems nonobvious to fellow lesswrongers (and therefore possibly wrong) is useful.
For example, my way resolves, or mostly resolves the blackmail/bargain distinction. Blackmail is when the pre-made choice is bad for you relative to the most reasonable other option, bargain is when it’s good for you.
Maybe I can explain what’s going on game-theoretically when I say “default” in this context.
You’re trying to establish a Nash equilibrium of, for actions in that category X:
You don’t do X// I punish you for doing X
Now the Schelling situation is that you may not be able to reach this equilibrium, if X is a strange and bizarre category, for instance, or if we’d prefer to prevent you from punishing us by locking you up instead.
So it may be that there is no one general category here. I could give in to terrorism but not blackmail, for instance. It’s about clusters in harmful-action-space.
Reducing the problem to a smaller problem, or another, already-existing problem, in a way that seems nonobvious to fellow lesswrongers (and therefore possibly wrong) is useful.
For example, my way resolves, or mostly resolves the blackmail/bargain distinction. Blackmail is when the pre-made choice is bad for you relative to the most reasonable other option, bargain is when it’s good for you.
Maybe I can explain what’s going on game-theoretically when I say “default” in this context.
You’re trying to establish a Nash equilibrium of, for actions in that category X:
You don’t do X// I punish you for doing X
Now the Schelling situation is that you may not be able to reach this equilibrium, if X is a strange and bizarre category, for instance, or if we’d prefer to prevent you from punishing us by locking you up instead.
So it may be that there is no one general category here. I could give in to terrorism but not blackmail, for instance. It’s about clusters in harmful-action-space.