The decision that maximises your gain, as Red, is for Blue to pick 5, −10. The decision that minimises your loss, as Blue, is to pick 5, −10. And so it is that extortionism is rediscovered by all agents like Red. But Blues sometimes pick −1, −20, more often than ‘some people are purely irrational’ would predict.
In a society that deeply understood game theory, they could recognise that this extortion scenario would be iterated. In an iterated series of extortion games, if a lunatic Blue completely ignored their own disutility to punish Red for extorting them, they could reduce Red’s utility below 0. At this point, Red would prefer not to have extorted the lunatic. If a Blue can convincingly signal their lunacy to potential extorter Reds, Reds will predictably leave said lunatic Blues alone. Therefore, the true decision tree, for both agents, looks like this.
Note that this is restricted to the long view of an iterated extortion game; understanding that precommitting to lunacy would have stopped Red will not magically undo the current situation, so if Blue knew that this case was unlikely to be part of an iterated series, they would simply capitulate. (Incidentally, this is why I do not extort people. Anyone worth extorting would be smart enough to figure out this line of reasoning, capitulate to me, and then expend some effort ensuring I was unable to iterate the series. Such as having me arrested or murdered.)
Whence the moral condemnation of extortion, then? Our morals and intuitions don’t exactly suggest all these options to us. Well, to a naive outsider looking in, the outcome of a game-theory society is that they usually refuse to cooperate with extortionists, they occasionally capitulate, and extortionists are hated. The naive outsider doesn’t see that extortionists are hated for trying to instantiate iterated negative-sum games, or the reasons why refusal is common and capitulation rare. All they see is that the game-theory society doesn’t have a problem with extortion. So they imitate the game-theory society’s actions, not reasons, get diminished but still impressive benefits, and expend far less energy working out these problems and far more energy copulating (a not entirely undesirable path).
There may not have been a game-theory society. In that case, producing animals that have irrationally have rough concepts of extortion and act in roughly the right way was an earlier solution than producing game-theory animals.
Extortion, then, is the label for events that roughly match the characteristics of negative-outcome trade from the perspective of the victim—that is, the victim would prefer the situation not to have taken place to either capitulating or refusing. The event only has to pattern-match this situation for people to think extortion.
If you would prefer the situation to not have happened, and you have reason to believe that there is a long enough iteration, and you can cause disutility for the agent that had a choice in causing the situation to happen, then suffering disutility to change the causal agent’s decision is the rational choice. Our intuition only shows us the individual slice, though, and some individual slices look like patently bizarre behaviour.
Of course, we would immensely prefer that this entire scenario of iterated extortion games resulting in disutility for both sides is simply a counterfactual in the mind of the potential extortionist.
Hmm. Bear with me.
Consider this decision tree
The decision that maximises your gain, as Red, is for Blue to pick 5, −10. The decision that minimises your loss, as Blue, is to pick 5, −10. And so it is that extortionism is rediscovered by all agents like Red. But Blues sometimes pick −1, −20, more often than ‘some people are purely irrational’ would predict.
In a society that deeply understood game theory, they could recognise that this extortion scenario would be iterated. In an iterated series of extortion games, if a lunatic Blue completely ignored their own disutility to punish Red for extorting them, they could reduce Red’s utility below 0. At this point, Red would prefer not to have extorted the lunatic. If a Blue can convincingly signal their lunacy to potential extorter Reds, Reds will predictably leave said lunatic Blues alone. Therefore, the true decision tree, for both agents, looks like this.
Note that this is restricted to the long view of an iterated extortion game; understanding that precommitting to lunacy would have stopped Red will not magically undo the current situation, so if Blue knew that this case was unlikely to be part of an iterated series, they would simply capitulate. (Incidentally, this is why I do not extort people. Anyone worth extorting would be smart enough to figure out this line of reasoning, capitulate to me, and then expend some effort ensuring I was unable to iterate the series. Such as having me arrested or murdered.)
Whence the moral condemnation of extortion, then? Our morals and intuitions don’t exactly suggest all these options to us. Well, to a naive outsider looking in, the outcome of a game-theory society is that they usually refuse to cooperate with extortionists, they occasionally capitulate, and extortionists are hated. The naive outsider doesn’t see that extortionists are hated for trying to instantiate iterated negative-sum games, or the reasons why refusal is common and capitulation rare. All they see is that the game-theory society doesn’t have a problem with extortion. So they imitate the game-theory society’s actions, not reasons, get diminished but still impressive benefits, and expend far less energy working out these problems and far more energy copulating (a not entirely undesirable path).
There may not have been a game-theory society. In that case, producing animals that have irrationally have rough concepts of extortion and act in roughly the right way was an earlier solution than producing game-theory animals.
Extortion, then, is the label for events that roughly match the characteristics of negative-outcome trade from the perspective of the victim—that is, the victim would prefer the situation not to have taken place to either capitulating or refusing. The event only has to pattern-match this situation for people to think extortion.
If you would prefer the situation to not have happened, and you have reason to believe that there is a long enough iteration, and you can cause disutility for the agent that had a choice in causing the situation to happen, then suffering disutility to change the causal agent’s decision is the rational choice. Our intuition only shows us the individual slice, though, and some individual slices look like patently bizarre behaviour.
Of course, we would immensely prefer that this entire scenario of iterated extortion games resulting in disutility for both sides is simply a counterfactual in the mind of the potential extortionist.