Saying that a thing is “hedonistically good to do” means that it is good to some extent. It does not tell us whether it is good to do, period. If it is good to do, period, it is morally good. If there are other considerations more important than the pleasure, it won’t be good to do, period, and so will be morally wrong.
It’s not helpful to define the morally good as the “good, period”, without an explanation of “good, period”. You are defining a more precise term using a less precise one, which isn’t the way to go.
Suppose there is a blue house with a red spot on it. You ask, “Is that a red house?” Someone answers, “Well, there is a red spot on it.”
There is no difference if there is something bad that you could do which would be pleasant. You ask, “Is that something good to do?” Someone answers, “Well, it is hedonistically good.”
But I don’t care if there is a red spot, or if it is pleasant. I am asking if the house is red, and if it would be good to do the thing.
Those are answered in similar ways: the house is red if it is red enough that a reasonable person would say, “yes, the house is red.” And the action is morally good if a reasonable person would say, “yes, it is good to do it.”
i think that’s a fairly misleading analogy. For instance, a house’s being red is not exclusive of another ones..but my goods can conflict with another person’s.
Survival is good, you say. If I am in a position to ensure my survival by sacrificing Smith, is it morally good to do so? After all Smith’s survival is just as Good as mine.
As I said, we are asking whether it is good to do something overall. So there is no definite answer to the question about Smith. In some cases it will be good to do that, and in some cases not, depending on the situation and what exactly you mean by sacrificing Smith.
As I said, we are asking whether it is good to do something overall. So there is no definite answer to the question about Smith.
So what you call goodness cannot be equated with moral goodness, because moral goodness does need to put an overall value on act, does need to say that an act is permitted, forbidden or obligatory.
I don’t understand what you are trying to say here. Of course in a particular situation it will be good, and thus morally right, to sacrifice Smith, and in other particular situations it will not be. I just said that you cannot say in advance, and I see no reason why moral goodness would have to judge these situations in advance without taking everything into account.
Saying that a thing is “hedonistically good to do” means that it is good to some extent. It does not tell us whether it is good to do, period. If it is good to do, period, it is morally good. If there are other considerations more important than the pleasure, it won’t be good to do, period, and so will be morally wrong.
It’s not helpful to define the morally good as the “good, period”, without an explanation of “good, period”. You are defining a more precise term using a less precise one, which isn’t the way to go.
Suppose there is a blue house with a red spot on it. You ask, “Is that a red house?” Someone answers, “Well, there is a red spot on it.”
There is no difference if there is something bad that you could do which would be pleasant. You ask, “Is that something good to do?” Someone answers, “Well, it is hedonistically good.”
But I don’t care if there is a red spot, or if it is pleasant. I am asking if the house is red, and if it would be good to do the thing.
Those are answered in similar ways: the house is red if it is red enough that a reasonable person would say, “yes, the house is red.” And the action is morally good if a reasonable person would say, “yes, it is good to do it.”
i think that’s a fairly misleading analogy. For instance, a house’s being red is not exclusive of another ones..but my goods can conflict with another person’s.
Survival is good, you say. If I am in a position to ensure my survival by sacrificing Smith, is it morally good to do so? After all Smith’s survival is just as Good as mine.
As I said, we are asking whether it is good to do something overall. So there is no definite answer to the question about Smith. In some cases it will be good to do that, and in some cases not, depending on the situation and what exactly you mean by sacrificing Smith.
So what you call goodness cannot be equated with moral goodness, because moral goodness does need to put an overall value on act, does need to say that an act is permitted, forbidden or obligatory.
I don’t understand what you are trying to say here. Of course in a particular situation it will be good, and thus morally right, to sacrifice Smith, and in other particular situations it will not be. I just said that you cannot say in advance, and I see no reason why moral goodness would have to judge these situations in advance without taking everything into account.