I think we care about whether or not we have free will because we associate it with accountability—both our own and others.
If someone picks me up and throws me on you, you should not blame me for getting slammed—this is not my fault, and I had no say in the matter. If someone points a gun at me and tells me to hit you, you probably won’t blame for complying. But if you had to rank my accountability in these two cases, it’s obvious that I’m more accountable in the latter because I did have a choice—I could not hit you and get shot. This is a very unfavorable choice and you would not expect me to pick it, so in the global scale of accountability it doesn’t really count as a choice—but if we zoom in to just these two cases it’s more choice than the no choice I got at the former case.
Moving on: if I steal food because I’m hungry, should I be held accountable?
This question is controversial in ethical philosophy, and I won’t form an opinion because the point of this exercise is not to solve such controversies—it’s to understand the cognition behind them. If I don’t eat for long enough, I will die. But unlike the case with the gun, I will not die immediately if I don’t steal this bread right now—so I don’t face immediate death, only hunger. I have more choice here—not enough choice to make me consensually accountable, but enough to push it from consensually unaccountable to controversial.
So, accountability is directly linked to will—the more freely I can use my will, the more accountable I should be for my actions. We want to know if people have free will because we want to know if (or—to what degree) they should be held accountable.
Why do we care about accountability? Because we want to punish and/or reward, but we don’t want to do that based on luck. If you punish me for stealing, but I stole because I’m hungry, then you punish me for being unlucky enough to go hungry—which is morally wrong. But it it “really” was my will to steal, then you are punishing me for stealing—which is morally right.
We care about free will because we don’t want to punish/reward people because of their circumstances—only because of their essences. To discuss the actual difference between circumstances and essences is to answer the question of free will—which is outside the scope of this exercise.
I think we care about whether or not we have free will because we associate it with accountability—both our own and others.
If someone picks me up and throws me on you, you should not blame me for getting slammed—this is not my fault, and I had no say in the matter. If someone points a gun at me and tells me to hit you, you probably won’t blame for complying. But if you had to rank my accountability in these two cases, it’s obvious that I’m more accountable in the latter because I did have a choice—I could not hit you and get shot. This is a very unfavorable choice and you would not expect me to pick it, so in the global scale of accountability it doesn’t really count as a choice—but if we zoom in to just these two cases it’s more choice than the no choice I got at the former case.
Moving on: if I steal food because I’m hungry, should I be held accountable?
This question is controversial in ethical philosophy, and I won’t form an opinion because the point of this exercise is not to solve such controversies—it’s to understand the cognition behind them. If I don’t eat for long enough, I will die. But unlike the case with the gun, I will not die immediately if I don’t steal this bread right now—so I don’t face immediate death, only hunger. I have more choice here—not enough choice to make me consensually accountable, but enough to push it from consensually unaccountable to controversial.
So, accountability is directly linked to will—the more freely I can use my will, the more accountable I should be for my actions. We want to know if people have free will because we want to know if (or—to what degree) they should be held accountable.
Why do we care about accountability? Because we want to punish and/or reward, but we don’t want to do that based on luck. If you punish me for stealing, but I stole because I’m hungry, then you punish me for being unlucky enough to go hungry—which is morally wrong. But it it “really” was my will to steal, then you are punishing me for stealing—which is morally right.
We care about free will because we don’t want to punish/reward people because of their circumstances—only because of their essences. To discuss the actual difference between circumstances and essences is to answer the question of free will—which is outside the scope of this exercise.