That’d provide a better means of comparison between culturally similar nations, but all I was trying to challenge was the assertion that low legal barriers to divorce set up an inevitable cascade of failures for reasons based mainly on economics rather than culture. One major barrier, as others have pointed out, is the difficulty of determining the direction of causation: statistics on non-divorce separations would help clear this up, but I haven’t been able to find any.
A glance over the statistics seems to reveal a correlation between divorce rates and low religiosity (the United States is an outlier on the high side), and another between divorce rates and the length of a mandatory trial separation. Probably neither one is much of a surprise.
But you have nothing to compare that rate to. The assertion was a connection between financially supporting people in certain situations and the rate at which those situations occur, and your counterexample doesn’t address that. A plausible mechanism seems pretty obvious—you’re making divorce easier, so a few borderline cases shift over the edge.
That’d provide a better means of comparison between culturally similar nations, but all I was trying to challenge was the assertion that low legal barriers to divorce set up an inevitable cascade of failures for reasons based mainly on economics rather than culture. One major barrier, as others have pointed out, is the difficulty of determining the direction of causation: statistics on non-divorce separations would help clear this up, but I haven’t been able to find any.
A glance over the statistics seems to reveal a correlation between divorce rates and low religiosity (the United States is an outlier on the high side), and another between divorce rates and the length of a mandatory trial separation. Probably neither one is much of a surprise.
But you have nothing to compare that rate to. The assertion was a connection between financially supporting people in certain situations and the rate at which those situations occur, and your counterexample doesn’t address that. A plausible mechanism seems pretty obvious—you’re making divorce easier, so a few borderline cases shift over the edge.