It seems to me like ‘intent to inform’ is worth thinking about in the context of its siblings; ‘intent to misinform’ and ‘intent to conceal.’ Cousins, like ‘intent to aggrandize’ or ‘intent to seduce’ or so on, I’ll leave to another time, tho you’re right to point out they’re almost always present, if just by being replaced by their reaction (like self-deprecation, to be sure of not self-aggrandizement).
Quakers were long renowned for following four virtues: peace, equality, simplicity, and truth. Unlike wizards, they have the benefit of being real, and so we can get more out of their experience of having to actually implement those virtues in a sometimes hostile world that pushes for compromises. So I pulled out my copy of Some Fruits of Solitude by William Penn, and the sections on Truth and Secrecy are short enough to quote in full (including Justice, which is in the middle):
Truth
144. When you speak, be sure to speak the truth, for misleading is halfway to lying, and lying is the whole way to Hell.
Justice
145. Don’t believe anything against another unless you have good grounds. And don’t share anything that might hurt another, unless it could cause greater hurt to others to keep it secret.
Secrecy
146. It is wise not to try to find out a secret, and honest not to reveal one.
147. Only trust yourself, and no one will betray you.
148. Excessive openness has the mischief of treachery, though not the malice.
One of the bits that fascinated me when I first read it was 146, which pretty firmly separates ‘intent to inform’ from ‘honesty’; there is such a thing as ownership of information, and honesty doesn’t involve giving up on that, or giving up on having secrets yourself.
What’s also interesting to me is that several of them embody bits of information about the social context. 145, for example, is good advice in general, but especially important if you have a reputation for telling the truth; then you become a target for rumor-starters, as people would take seriously stories you repeat even if they wouldn’t take them seriously from the original source. It also covers situations like Viliam’s, drawing a line that determines which negative beliefs should be broadcast. And in 146 again, being able to respond to questions about secrets with “I’d rather not say” relies on a social context where people think it wise to not press for further details (because otherwise you encourage a lie, instead of a straightforward “please direct your attention elsewhere.”).
But I’m not trying to conceal information. I just want to ensure that the information is only engaged with in the context that doesn’t lead people to draw the obviously wrong conclusions.
That feels like straightforwardly part of ‘intent to inform’, where if you expect someone to misunderstand you if you say X, then you don’t say X. (And it seems like 148 applies.)
It’s a form of writing the bottom line first and grants wide enough latitude to justify maintaining information asymmetries for personal benefit. It’s even true a decent amount of the time, which is what makes it so dangerous.
It seems to me like ‘intent to inform’ is worth thinking about in the context of its siblings; ‘intent to misinform’ and ‘intent to conceal.’ Cousins, like ‘intent to aggrandize’ or ‘intent to seduce’ or so on, I’ll leave to another time, tho you’re right to point out they’re almost always present, if just by being replaced by their reaction (like self-deprecation, to be sure of not self-aggrandizement).
Quakers were long renowned for following four virtues: peace, equality, simplicity, and truth. Unlike wizards, they have the benefit of being real, and so we can get more out of their experience of having to actually implement those virtues in a sometimes hostile world that pushes for compromises. So I pulled out my copy of Some Fruits of Solitude by William Penn, and the sections on Truth and Secrecy are short enough to quote in full (including Justice, which is in the middle):
One of the bits that fascinated me when I first read it was 146, which pretty firmly separates ‘intent to inform’ from ‘honesty’; there is such a thing as ownership of information, and honesty doesn’t involve giving up on that, or giving up on having secrets yourself.
What’s also interesting to me is that several of them embody bits of information about the social context. 145, for example, is good advice in general, but especially important if you have a reputation for telling the truth; then you become a target for rumor-starters, as people would take seriously stories you repeat even if they wouldn’t take them seriously from the original source. It also covers situations like Viliam’s, drawing a line that determines which negative beliefs should be broadcast. And in 146 again, being able to respond to questions about secrets with “I’d rather not say” relies on a social context where people think it wise to not press for further details (because otherwise you encourage a lie, instead of a straightforward “please direct your attention elsewhere.”).
This is personally quite helpful, thanks for posting it.
I recommend the whole book; it’s quite short. (Tho looking at the linked copy, I see it’s the original form, with all the archaisms; the physical one I have is edited into modern English by Eric K. Taylor.)
But I’m not trying to conceal information. I just want to ensure that the information is only engaged with in the context that doesn’t lead people to draw the obviously wrong conclusions.
That feels like straightforwardly part of ‘intent to inform’, where if you expect someone to misunderstand you if you say X, then you don’t say X. (And it seems like 148 applies.)
It’s a form of writing the bottom line first and grants wide enough latitude to justify maintaining information asymmetries for personal benefit. It’s even true a decent amount of the time, which is what makes it so dangerous.