I’m not. I find your deontological murder exception ad hoc. My hypothetical hitman’s moral foundations rest solidly on the notions, standard among “Effective Altruists,” that one can value human lives in terms of money, that one can engage in tradeoffs involving lives, that the lives of people in Africa or wherever aren’t worth more an order of magnitude less than those of people in, say, America, and that GiveWell’s estimates of how much it costs to save a life are reasonable.
I’m not. I find your deontological murder exception ad hoc. My hypothetical hitman’s moral foundations rest solidly on the notions, standard among “Effective Altruists,” that one can value human lives in terms of money, that one can engage in tradeoffs involving lives, that the lives of people in Africa or wherever aren’t worth more an order of magnitude less than those of people in, say, America, and that GiveWell’s estimates of how much it costs to save a life are reasonable.