In this analogy, the map is playing the role of “model” (as it assigns sentences to the analog of truth values).
Note that in order for the map to be a model, the map must have certain behavior (whenever both φ and ψ map to 1, φ∧ψ also maps to 1, etc.). In model theory we restrict consideration to maps obeying these laws; if your map strays outside these boundaries then model theory has nothing to say about it.
In model theory, we say that a model is “of” a theory when the model holds true all sentences in the given theory. Thus, in your construction, the preimage of 1 would be the theory of the map (the largest theory that the map is a model of).
If you construct a different theory T that contains sentences not in the preimage of 1, then we would say the map is not a model of T (because there are sentences of T which are not “true” under the map).
The object you’re discussing in pt.5 (the intersection between the theory of a model and some other theory) does not have an obvious analog in model theory.
In this analogy, the map is playing the role of “model” (as it assigns sentences to the analog of truth values).
Hmm, I thought only the preimage of 1 is the model.
in your construction, the preimage of 1 would be the theory of the map (the largest theory that the map is a model of).
But… a theory can include sentences not in the preimage of 1 (undecidable?)… I am confused.
I would instead say that the preimage of 1 is the largest model of the map, and is the model of any “large enough” theory.
Note that in order for the map to be a model, the map must have certain behavior (whenever both φ and ψ map to 1, φ∧ψ also maps to 1, etc.). In model theory we restrict consideration to maps obeying these laws; if your map strays outside these boundaries then model theory has nothing to say about it.
Where are these laws defined? In the logic? In the logic+language? Then the only “valid” maps are those which are homomorphisms (in some sense) from logic(?) to the Z_2 subset (true/false) of the codomain.
I’ve missed something in my explanation of models. Allow me to define them more precisely.
Intuitively, we want an “interpretation” of the sentences generated by a logic+language which assigns each to a truth value. Model theory formalizes this as an object+relation, but we can also look at it as a map from sentences onto Z_2.
Any such means of assigning a sentence to {true, false} (or equivalent) is an “interpretation” of sorts, but not necessarily a model. We reserve the term “model” specifically for not-stupid interpretations (ones where the interpretation maps “x” and “not x” to different values, etc.)
In your construction, when you consider a surjection from sentences to some set and pick one element of the range to be “truth”, you’ve essentially defined an interpretation in a roundabout way. (Every sentence mapped to 1 is true in that interpretation, every sentence mapped elsewhere is false in that interpretation.)
If your interpretation obeys the rules of logic (“x*y” maps to 1 whenever “x” maps to 1 and “y” maps to 1) then it’s a model. Otherwise, model theory doesn’t have much to say about it.
I’m not sure I understand the construct you’re describing: does the above help at all? I’m not sure if I’m answering the right questions.
Don’t worry about decidability in this context, I think it might be confusing things somewhat. The point I was making earlier about completeness is this:
If you consider the set of all sentences as the domain of your map, then a “theory” T is just a subset of the domain of your map. If there are multiple models (functions which obey the rules of the logic) from the set of all sentences onto Z_2 which map the subset of all sentences (theory) T to 1, then T is “incomplete”.
Still a little off base.
In this analogy, the map is playing the role of “model” (as it assigns sentences to the analog of truth values).
Note that in order for the map to be a model, the map must have certain behavior (whenever both φ and ψ map to 1, φ∧ψ also maps to 1, etc.). In model theory we restrict consideration to maps obeying these laws; if your map strays outside these boundaries then model theory has nothing to say about it.
In model theory, we say that a model is “of” a theory when the model holds true all sentences in the given theory. Thus, in your construction, the preimage of 1 would be the theory of the map (the largest theory that the map is a model of).
If you construct a different theory T that contains sentences not in the preimage of 1, then we would say the map is not a model of T (because there are sentences of T which are not “true” under the map).
The object you’re discussing in pt.5 (the intersection between the theory of a model and some other theory) does not have an obvious analog in model theory.
Thank you for your patience!
Hmm, I thought only the preimage of 1 is the model.
But… a theory can include sentences not in the preimage of 1 (undecidable?)… I am confused.
I would instead say that the preimage of 1 is the largest model of the map, and is the model of any “large enough” theory.
Where are these laws defined? In the logic? In the logic+language? Then the only “valid” maps are those which are homomorphisms (in some sense) from logic(?) to the Z_2 subset (true/false) of the codomain.
Thanks again!
I’ve missed something in my explanation of models. Allow me to define them more precisely.
Intuitively, we want an “interpretation” of the sentences generated by a logic+language which assigns each to a truth value. Model theory formalizes this as an object+relation, but we can also look at it as a map from sentences onto Z_2.
Any such means of assigning a sentence to {true, false} (or equivalent) is an “interpretation” of sorts, but not necessarily a model. We reserve the term “model” specifically for not-stupid interpretations (ones where the interpretation maps “x” and “not x” to different values, etc.)
In your construction, when you consider a surjection from sentences to some set and pick one element of the range to be “truth”, you’ve essentially defined an interpretation in a roundabout way. (Every sentence mapped to 1 is true in that interpretation, every sentence mapped elsewhere is false in that interpretation.)
If your interpretation obeys the rules of logic (“x*y” maps to 1 whenever “x” maps to 1 and “y” maps to 1) then it’s a model. Otherwise, model theory doesn’t have much to say about it.
I’m not sure I understand the construct you’re describing: does the above help at all? I’m not sure if I’m answering the right questions.
Don’t worry about decidability in this context, I think it might be confusing things somewhat. The point I was making earlier about completeness is this:
If you consider the set of all sentences as the domain of your map, then a “theory” T is just a subset of the domain of your map. If there are multiple models (functions which obey the rules of the logic) from the set of all sentences onto Z_2 which map the subset of all sentences (theory) T to 1, then T is “incomplete”.
OK, I think I have a clearer picture now, between yours and DavidS’s explanations. I only wish I had a chance to learn it in school. Thanks!