I agree that you can have some probable information about what you will decide before you are finished deciding, but as you noted, that is not relevant anyway.
If I decide to smoke but take no action, is there any problem?
It isn’t clear what you mean by “is there any problem?” If you mean, is there a problem with this description of the situation, then yes, there is some cause missing. In other words, once you decide to smoke, you will smoke unless something comes up to prevent it: e.g. the cigarettes are missing, or you change your mind, or at least forget about it, or whatever.
If you meant, “am I likely to get cancer,” the answer is yes. Because the lesion is correlated with deciding to smoke, and it causes cancer. So even if something comes up to prevent smoking, you still likely have the lesion, and therefore likely get cancer.
Newcomb is similar: if you decide to take only one box, but then absentmindedly grab them both, the million will be likely to be there. While if you decide to take both, but the second one slips out of your hands, the million will be likely not to be there.
It isn’t clear what you mean by “is there any problem?”
Much of the confusion around the Smoking Lesion centers on whether your choice makes any difference to the outcome. If we disassemble the choice into two components of “learning” and “doing”, it becomes clear (to me, at least) that the “learning” part will cause you to update your estimates and the “doing” part will, er, do nothing. In this framework there is no ambiguity about causality, free will, etc.
I agree that you can have some probable information about what you will decide before you are finished deciding, but as you noted, that is not relevant anyway.
It isn’t clear what you mean by “is there any problem?” If you mean, is there a problem with this description of the situation, then yes, there is some cause missing. In other words, once you decide to smoke, you will smoke unless something comes up to prevent it: e.g. the cigarettes are missing, or you change your mind, or at least forget about it, or whatever.
If you meant, “am I likely to get cancer,” the answer is yes. Because the lesion is correlated with deciding to smoke, and it causes cancer. So even if something comes up to prevent smoking, you still likely have the lesion, and therefore likely get cancer.
Newcomb is similar: if you decide to take only one box, but then absentmindedly grab them both, the million will be likely to be there. While if you decide to take both, but the second one slips out of your hands, the million will be likely not to be there.
Much of the confusion around the Smoking Lesion centers on whether your choice makes any difference to the outcome. If we disassemble the choice into two components of “learning” and “doing”, it becomes clear (to me, at least) that the “learning” part will cause you to update your estimates and the “doing” part will, er, do nothing. In this framework there is no ambiguity about causality, free will, etc.
You seem to be ignoring the deciding again. But in any case, I agree that causality and free will are irrelevant. I have been saying that all along.