In answer to your broader question—yup: you’ve hit upon epistemic nihilism, and there is no real way around it. Reason is Dead, and we have killed it. Despair.
...Or, just shrug and decide that you are probably right but you can’t prove it. There’s plenty of academic philosophy addressing this (See: Problem of Criterion) and Lesswrong covers it fairly extensively as well.
Rather than going on a reading binge I recommend to just continue mulling it over until it clicks into place, because, similar to the whole “dissolve free will” thing, it feels clear in hindsight yet it is not easy to explain or understand explanations others provide.
I’ll give it a shot anyway: The essential point is that ultimately you are a brain and you gonna do things the way your brain is designed to do them. Assuming you’ve satisfactorily resolved the whole moral nihilism thing (even though there is no divine justification for morality, we can still talk about what is moral and what isn’t because morality is inside us), resolving epistemic nihilism follows an analogous chain of thought: There is not and cannot be any justification for human methods of inference[morality], but it still is our method of inference[morality] and we’re gonna use it regardless.
In general. I hear the word used but I haven’t ever encountered it in literature (which isn’t very surprising since I haven’t read much literature). Seriously, Google ‘epistemic nihilism’ right now and all you get are some cursory references and blogs.
Maybe I wasn’t clear: I’m questioning whether the premise of your question
Why does everyone refer to it as “epistemic nihilism”?
is correct. I don’t think everyone does refer to it that way, whether “everyone” means “everyone globally”, “everyone on LW”, “everyone in the comments to this post”, or in fact anything beyond “one or two people who are making terminology up on the fly or who happen to want to draw a parallel with some other kind of nihilism”.
I’ve heard it from various people on the internet. Perhaps I don’t have a large sample size, but it seems to consistently pop up when global skepticism is discussed.
At first I just made it up, feeling that it was appropriate name due to the many parallels with moral nihilism, then I googled it, and description that came up roughly matched what I was talking about, so I just went on using it after that. I’m guessing everyone goes roughly through that process. Normally I add a little disclaimer about not being sure that if it is the correct term, but I didn’t this time.
I didn’t know the term “philosophical skepticism”, thanks for giving me the correct one. In philosophy I feel there is generally problem where the process of figuring out the names that other people who separately came up with your concept before you did use to describe the concept you want ends up involving more work and reading than just re-doing everything...and at the end of the day others who read your text (as if anyone is reading that closely!) won’t understand what you meant unless they too go back and read the citations. So I think it’s often better to just throw aside the clutter and start fresh for everything, doing your best with plain English, and it’s okay if you redundantly rederive things (many strongly disagree with me here).
I feel that the definition of “Epistemic nihilism” is self evident as long as one knows the words “epistemic” and “nihilism”. The term “Skepticism” implies the view that one is asking “how do you know”, whereas nihilism implies that one is claiming that there is no fundamental justification of the chosen principles. If indeed I’m describing the same thing, I kinda think “epistemic nihilism” is a more descriptive term from a “plain english” perspective overall.
(Also, re: everyone—I haven’t actually seen that term used in the wild by people who are not me unless explicitly googling it. Maybe your impression results from reading my comments somewhere else?)
I didn’t know the term “philosophical skepticism”, thanks for giving me the correct one.
‘Global skepticism’ is really the correct one. ‘Philosophical skepticism’ is just a broad term for the doubting of normative justifications or knowledge.
(Also, re: everyone—I haven’t actually seen that term used in the wild by people who are not me unless explicitly googling it. Maybe your impression results from reading my comments somewhere else?)
I doubt it very much. But some of the comments gave me the impression that it is in literature somewhere.
However, our concepts of truth and goodness allow us to pose the questions:standard responsesIsm persuaded of it, but is it really true? I approve of it, but is it really good?
The simple version of internalising truth and goodness by rubber stamping prevailing attitudes is not satisfactory; the complex version......is complex.
I’m persuaded of it, but is it really true? I approve of it, but is it really good?
Yes, that is precisely the relevant question—and my answer is that there’s no non-circular justification for a mind’s thoughts and preferences (moral or otherwise), and so for both practical and theoretical purposes we must operate on a sort of “faith” that there is some validity to at least some of our faculties, admitting that it is ultimately just simple faith that lies at the bottom of it all. (Not faith as in “believing without evidence”, but faith as in “there shall never be any further evidence or justification for this, yet I find that I am pursuaded of it / do believe it is really good.)
The simple version of internalising truth and goodness by rubber stamping prevailing attitudes is not satisfactory; the complex version......is complex.
It’s not really that bad or complex—all you have to believe in is the concept of justification and evidence itself. To attempt to go deeper is to ask justification for the concept of justification, and evidence for what is or is not evidence, and that’s nonsense.
Agreed, I don’t think the question is meaningless. I do, however, think that it’s “provably” unanswerable (assuming you provisionally accept all the premises that go into proving things)
But that isn’t the same thing at all. If you have a fiundationalistic epistemic structure resting on proveably unprovable foundations, you are in big trouble.
Memories can be collapsed under percepts.
In answer to your broader question—yup: you’ve hit upon epistemic nihilism, and there is no real way around it. Reason is Dead, and we have killed it. Despair.
...Or, just shrug and decide that you are probably right but you can’t prove it. There’s plenty of academic philosophy addressing this (See: Problem of Criterion) and Lesswrong covers it fairly extensively as well.
http://lesswrong.com/lw/t9/no_license_to_be_human/ and related posts.
http://lesswrong.com/lw/iza/no_universally_compelling_arguments_in_math_or/
Rather than going on a reading binge I recommend to just continue mulling it over until it clicks into place, because, similar to the whole “dissolve free will” thing, it feels clear in hindsight yet it is not easy to explain or understand explanations others provide.
I’ll give it a shot anyway: The essential point is that ultimately you are a brain and you gonna do things the way your brain is designed to do them. Assuming you’ve satisfactorily resolved the whole moral nihilism thing (even though there is no divine justification for morality, we can still talk about what is moral and what isn’t because morality is inside us), resolving epistemic nihilism follows an analogous chain of thought: There is not and cannot be any justification for human methods of inference[morality], but it still is our method of inference[morality] and we’re gonna use it regardless.
Why does everyone refer to it as “epistemic nihilism”? Philosophical skepticism (‘global’ skepticism) was always the term I read and used.
Everyone? In this discussion right here, the only occurrences of the word “nihilism” are in Ishaan’s comment and your reply?
In general. I hear the word used but I haven’t ever encountered it in literature (which isn’t very surprising since I haven’t read much literature). Seriously, Google ‘epistemic nihilism’ right now and all you get are some cursory references and blogs.
Maybe I wasn’t clear: I’m questioning whether the premise of your question
is correct. I don’t think everyone does refer to it that way, whether “everyone” means “everyone globally”, “everyone on LW”, “everyone in the comments to this post”, or in fact anything beyond “one or two people who are making terminology up on the fly or who happen to want to draw a parallel with some other kind of nihilism”.
I’ve heard it from various people on the internet. Perhaps I don’t have a large sample size, but it seems to consistently pop up when global skepticism is discussed.
At first I just made it up, feeling that it was appropriate name due to the many parallels with moral nihilism, then I googled it, and description that came up roughly matched what I was talking about, so I just went on using it after that. I’m guessing everyone goes roughly through that process. Normally I add a little disclaimer about not being sure that if it is the correct term, but I didn’t this time.
I didn’t know the term “philosophical skepticism”, thanks for giving me the correct one. In philosophy I feel there is generally problem where the process of figuring out the names that other people who separately came up with your concept before you did use to describe the concept you want ends up involving more work and reading than just re-doing everything...and at the end of the day others who read your text (as if anyone is reading that closely!) won’t understand what you meant unless they too go back and read the citations. So I think it’s often better to just throw aside the clutter and start fresh for everything, doing your best with plain English, and it’s okay if you redundantly rederive things (many strongly disagree with me here).
I feel that the definition of “Epistemic nihilism” is self evident as long as one knows the words “epistemic” and “nihilism”. The term “Skepticism” implies the view that one is asking “how do you know”, whereas nihilism implies that one is claiming that there is no fundamental justification of the chosen principles. If indeed I’m describing the same thing, I kinda think “epistemic nihilism” is a more descriptive term from a “plain english” perspective overall.
(Also, re: everyone—I haven’t actually seen that term used in the wild by people who are not me unless explicitly googling it. Maybe your impression results from reading my comments somewhere else?)
‘Global skepticism’ is really the correct one. ‘Philosophical skepticism’ is just a broad term for the doubting of normative justifications or knowledge.
I doubt it very much. But some of the comments gave me the impression that it is in literature somewhere.
“Epistemic nihilism” is not a name, but a description. Philosophical skepticism covers a range of things, of which this is one.
However, our concepts of truth and goodness allow us to pose the questions:standard responsesIsm persuaded of it, but is it really true? I approve of it, but is it really good?
The simple version of internalising truth and goodness by rubber stamping prevailing attitudes is not satisfactory; the complex version......is complex.
Yes, that is precisely the relevant question—and my answer is that there’s no non-circular justification for a mind’s thoughts and preferences (moral or otherwise), and so for both practical and theoretical purposes we must operate on a sort of “faith” that there is some validity to at least some of our faculties, admitting that it is ultimately just simple faith that lies at the bottom of it all. (Not faith as in “believing without evidence”, but faith as in “there shall never be any further evidence or justification for this, yet I find that I am pursuaded of it / do believe it is really good.)
It’s not really that bad or complex—all you have to believe in is the concept of justification and evidence itself. To attempt to go deeper is to ask justification for the concept of justification, and evidence for what is or is not evidence, and that’s nonsense.
Ostensibly, those are meaningful questions. It would be comvemeimt if any question you couldn’t answer was nonsense, but...
Agreed, I don’t think the question is meaningless. I do, however, think that it’s “provably” unanswerable (assuming you provisionally accept all the premises that go into proving things)
But that isn’t the same thing at all. If you have a fiundationalistic epistemic structure resting on proveably unprovable foundations, you are in big trouble.