Could you possibly take your prolific imagination for how this is misspecified or wrong, and turn to imagining ways to improve it or patch it up?
For example, suppose that winning A, instead of guarantees extending into the far future, merely gives you a very large gift in the near future.
Alternatively, suppose that all of your questions regarding A were answered “Yes”.
Alternatively, is it not possible to price a bet offered to you even if you are uncertain regarding exactly how much you would win, if you did win?
Well, I’m not sure what it’s supposed to specify.
For instance, under your first suggestion—that A is an immediate prize of e.g. money—the PLP becomes simple risk aversion of death vs. money. The original description seemed to suggest more than that, what with choosing whole alternative futures.
Could you possibly take your prolific imagination for how this is misspecified or wrong, and turn to imagining ways to improve it or patch it up?
For example, suppose that winning A, instead of guarantees extending into the far future, merely gives you a very large gift in the near future.
Alternatively, suppose that all of your questions regarding A were answered “Yes”.
Alternatively, is it not possible to price a bet offered to you even if you are uncertain regarding exactly how much you would win, if you did win?
Well, I’m not sure what it’s supposed to specify.
For instance, under your first suggestion—that A is an immediate prize of e.g. money—the PLP becomes simple risk aversion of death vs. money. The original description seemed to suggest more than that, what with choosing whole alternative futures.