I see the child-in-a-pond scenario as an intuition pump. It takes a case where people naturally tend to care about others and feel an inclination/urge/motivation to help (even at a cost to themselves) and connects it to global poverty charity to try to induce the same urge to help others in the context of global poverty. Two of the main changes that it makes in reframing the problem are:
It takes a problem that’s far and makes it up-close and personal, with a drowning child right there in front of you.
It takes the marginal benefit that you can provide by donating one life’s worth of money ($3k or so) and treats that as the entire problem. (When reality is more like: in expectation 1,184,506 people will die of malaria this year if you don’t help, and for each $1k that you give that number drops by 0.3 expected deaths.)
The second change is important because there are several related heuristics / mental models / lines of reasoning that influence how much of an urge to help a person feels. Solving a problem feels more satisfying than slightly reducing the extent of a problem, there is a stronger urge to help when you are the only one who can help vs. when lots of people can help and the question arises of whether each person is doing their share, and a yes-or-no question about whether to help by a moderate amount feels more motivating than a boundless demand for all the help you can give (where any bit of help could lead one down a slippery slope).
If the framing from the child-in-a-pond scenario sticks, then it can not only make them more likely to give, it can also make them feel better about giving by replacing those thought patterns with one where giving is tied to a naturally arising positive motivation to help (rather than some external obligation) and is framed in a way that encourages you to feel good about the help that you do provide (instead of feeling overwhelmed about the scope of the problem, etc.).
I agree with these points, and with Holden’s view that Singer’s child-in-a-pond argument is generally underappreciated rather than overappreciated.
The part that I was highlighting as misleading is the implicitly claimed effect size. People who aspire to do the most good may be connotatively misled by into thinking that alleviating global poverty is a more promising target for optimal philanthropy than it actually is.
I see the child-in-a-pond scenario as an intuition pump. It takes a case where people naturally tend to care about others and feel an inclination/urge/motivation to help (even at a cost to themselves) and connects it to global poverty charity to try to induce the same urge to help others in the context of global poverty. Two of the main changes that it makes in reframing the problem are:
It takes a problem that’s far and makes it up-close and personal, with a drowning child right there in front of you.
It takes the marginal benefit that you can provide by donating one life’s worth of money ($3k or so) and treats that as the entire problem. (When reality is more like: in expectation 1,184,506 people will die of malaria this year if you don’t help, and for each $1k that you give that number drops by 0.3 expected deaths.)
The second change is important because there are several related heuristics / mental models / lines of reasoning that influence how much of an urge to help a person feels. Solving a problem feels more satisfying than slightly reducing the extent of a problem, there is a stronger urge to help when you are the only one who can help vs. when lots of people can help and the question arises of whether each person is doing their share, and a yes-or-no question about whether to help by a moderate amount feels more motivating than a boundless demand for all the help you can give (where any bit of help could lead one down a slippery slope).
If the framing from the child-in-a-pond scenario sticks, then it can not only make them more likely to give, it can also make them feel better about giving by replacing those thought patterns with one where giving is tied to a naturally arising positive motivation to help (rather than some external obligation) and is framed in a way that encourages you to feel good about the help that you do provide (instead of feeling overwhelmed about the scope of the problem, etc.).
I agree with these points, and with Holden’s view that Singer’s child-in-a-pond argument is generally underappreciated rather than overappreciated.
The part that I was highlighting as misleading is the implicitly claimed effect size. People who aspire to do the most good may be connotatively misled by into thinking that alleviating global poverty is a more promising target for optimal philanthropy than it actually is.