How can you confirm the model of “past predictions predict future predictions” with the data that “in the past past predictions have predicted future predictions?” Isn’t that circular?
The meta-observation (and the first implicit and trivially simple meta-model) is that accurate predictions are possible. Translated to the realist’s speak it would say something like “the universe is predictable, to some degree”. Which is just as circular, since without predictability there would be no agents to talk about predictability.
Once you postulate the territory behind your observations, you start using misleading and ill-defined terms like “exists”, “real” and “true”, and argue, say, which interpretation of QM is “true” or whether numbers “exist”, or whether unicorns are “real”. If you stick to models only, none of these are meaningful statements and so there is no reason to argue about them. Let’s go through these examples:
The orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics is useful in calculating the cross sections, because it deals with the results of a measurement. The many-worlds interpretation is useful in pushing the limits of our understanding of the interface between quantum and classical, like in the Wigner’s friend setup.
Numbers are a useful mental tool in multiple situations, they make many other models more accurate.
Unicorns are real in a context of a relevant story, or as a plushie, or in a hallucination. They are a poor model of the kind of observation that lets us see, say, horses, but an excellent one if you are wandering through a toy store.
How can you confirm the model of “past predictions predict future predictions” with the data that “in the past past predictions have predicted future predictions?” Isn’t that circular?
The meta-observation (and the first implicit and trivially simple meta-model) is that accurate predictions are possible. Translated to the realist’s speak it would say something like “the universe is predictable, to some degree”. Which is just as circular, since without predictability there would be no agents to talk about predictability.
In what way is your meta-observation of consistency different than the belief in a territory?
Once you postulate the territory behind your observations, you start using misleading and ill-defined terms like “exists”, “real” and “true”, and argue, say, which interpretation of QM is “true” or whether numbers “exist”, or whether unicorns are “real”. If you stick to models only, none of these are meaningful statements and so there is no reason to argue about them. Let’s go through these examples:
The orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics is useful in calculating the cross sections, because it deals with the results of a measurement. The many-worlds interpretation is useful in pushing the limits of our understanding of the interface between quantum and classical, like in the Wigner’s friend setup.
Numbers are a useful mental tool in multiple situations, they make many other models more accurate.
Unicorns are real in a context of a relevant story, or as a plushie, or in a hallucination. They are a poor model of the kind of observation that lets us see, say, horses, but an excellent one if you are wandering through a toy store.
Why can’t you just believe in the territory without trying g to confuse it with maps?
To me belief in the territory is the confused one :)
Because you don’t believe territory “exists” or because it’s simpler to not model it twice—once on a map, once outside?
The latter. Also postulating immutable territory outside all maps means asking toxic questions about what exists, what is real and what is a fact.