People tend not to believe things because they’re true, but for some other reason.
Pr(People Believe | True) < Pr(People Believe | Some other explanation)? I would hazard to guess that the number of untrue things people have believed all throughout human history overshadows the number of things they (we) have believed that were actually true.
It’s a bit of an ad hominem, but logical fallacies can be viewed as weak Bayesian evidence.
People tend not to believe things because they’re true, but for some other reason.
Pr(People Believe | True) < Pr(People Believe | Some other explanation)? I would hazard to guess that the number of untrue things people have believed all throughout human history overshadows the number of things they (we) have believed that were actually true.
It’s a bit of an ad hominem, but logical fallacies can be viewed as weak Bayesian evidence.