I don’t think that’s a very good example of agent-relativity. Those who would argue that only humans matter seldom (if ever) do so on the basis of agent-relative concerns: it’s not that I am supposed to have a special obligation to humans because I’m human; it’s that only humans are supposed to matter at all.
In any event, the point wasn’t that agent relative weights don’t make sense, it’s that they’re not part of a standard definition of utilitarianism, even in a broad sense. I still think that’s accurate characterization of professional usage, but if you have specific examples to the contrary, I’d be open to changing my mind.
You may be right. But we’re inching pretty close towards arguing by definition now. So to avoid that, let me rephrase my original response to mattnewport’s question:
You’re right, by most interpretations utilitarianism does weigh everybody equally. However, if that’s the only thing in utilitarianism that you disagree with, and like the ethical system otherwise, then go ahead and adopt as your moral system a utilitarianism-derived one that differs from normal utilitarianism only in that you weight your family more than others. It may not be utilitarianism, but why should you care about what your moral system is called?
I don’t think that’s a very good example of agent-relativity. Those who would argue that only humans matter seldom (if ever) do so on the basis of agent-relative concerns: it’s not that I am supposed to have a special obligation to humans because I’m human; it’s that only humans are supposed to matter at all.
In any event, the point wasn’t that agent relative weights don’t make sense, it’s that they’re not part of a standard definition of utilitarianism, even in a broad sense. I still think that’s accurate characterization of professional usage, but if you have specific examples to the contrary, I’d be open to changing my mind.
Gratuitous nitpick: humans are animals too.
You may be right. But we’re inching pretty close towards arguing by definition now. So to avoid that, let me rephrase my original response to mattnewport’s question:
You’re right, by most interpretations utilitarianism does weigh everybody equally. However, if that’s the only thing in utilitarianism that you disagree with, and like the ethical system otherwise, then go ahead and adopt as your moral system a utilitarianism-derived one that differs from normal utilitarianism only in that you weight your family more than others. It may not be utilitarianism, but why should you care about what your moral system is called?
I completely agree with your reframing.
I (mistakenly) thought your original point was a definitional one, and that we had been discussing definitions the entire time. Apologies.
No problem. It happens.