Phil of FB: (A more concrete example: 10,000 people are traveling to Mars. 1,000 board a large slow shuttle that takes a single trip to Mars between t1 and t3. Meanwhile, a really fast smaller shuttle takes 10 people at a time to Mars (going back and forth 900 times) during this same period. At time t3, all 10,000 people have safely arrived on Mars. If asked, at t3, whether one took the large slow shuttle or the fast small shuttle, one should say the latter. (Right?) But this is the opposite answer, I believe, that one should give if in the middle of the journey, at time t2, one is aroused from one’s hibernation (let’s say) and asked whether they are at that very moment on the slow or fast shuttle. Thus, it seems to matter whether the relevant event is ongoing or over. But I’m not exactly clear about why.)
My reply: Imagine there is a random person BOB. If Bob asked before flight to Mars, he will said that he will most likely fly small and quick spaceship. But if we ask a random person during the flight (And if it he is Bob—which is important point here) - than Bob is most likely on a large space plane. But the difference in both situation is that we must add probability that random person will be Bob. And this probability is rather small and will exactly compensate. The fact which is not represented is that there is third group of all travellers, which are already on Mars or wait start on earth, and when I am told that in the moment T3 I still flying, I get information, that I am not one of 8990 “waiters” and update my probabilities accordingly.
Now, about simulation. The fact that they will be run serially is very unlikely apriori, so any probability shift from it will be not high. And could not be known from inside a simulation, or it is not a simulation, or at least completely isolated simulation. But it is not the main objection. The main is that if I know that I am in the exact time moment in future, I also know that I am in simulation, as my time is not the same as outside time provided to me. There is also problems with many my copies in the infinite number of simulation and real worlds, which make total calculation even more difficult. The same me could appear in real world and in simulation, so saying that I am in one specific type of world is meaningless until I get some evidences. I am the same in many worlds. But after I get evidence that I am in a simulation, it is not a simulation.
Phil of FB: (A more concrete example: 10,000 people are traveling to Mars. 1,000 board a large slow shuttle that takes a single trip to Mars between t1 and t3. Meanwhile, a really fast smaller shuttle takes 10 people at a time to Mars (going back and forth 900 times) during this same period. At time t3, all 10,000 people have safely arrived on Mars. If asked, at t3, whether one took the large slow shuttle or the fast small shuttle, one should say the latter. (Right?) But this is the opposite answer, I believe, that one should give if in the middle of the journey, at time t2, one is aroused from one’s hibernation (let’s say) and asked whether they are at that very moment on the slow or fast shuttle. Thus, it seems to matter whether the relevant event is ongoing or over. But I’m not exactly clear about why.)
My reply: Imagine there is a random person BOB. If Bob asked before flight to Mars, he will said that he will most likely fly small and quick spaceship. But if we ask a random person during the flight (And if it he is Bob—which is important point here) - than Bob is most likely on a large space plane. But the difference in both situation is that we must add probability that random person will be Bob. And this probability is rather small and will exactly compensate. The fact which is not represented is that there is third group of all travellers, which are already on Mars or wait start on earth, and when I am told that in the moment T3 I still flying, I get information, that I am not one of 8990 “waiters” and update my probabilities accordingly.
Now, about simulation. The fact that they will be run serially is very unlikely apriori, so any probability shift from it will be not high. And could not be known from inside a simulation, or it is not a simulation, or at least completely isolated simulation. But it is not the main objection. The main is that if I know that I am in the exact time moment in future, I also know that I am in simulation, as my time is not the same as outside time provided to me. There is also problems with many my copies in the infinite number of simulation and real worlds, which make total calculation even more difficult. The same me could appear in real world and in simulation, so saying that I am in one specific type of world is meaningless until I get some evidences. I am the same in many worlds. But after I get evidence that I am in a simulation, it is not a simulation.