Eliezer_Yudkowsky wrote:
“I want to reply, “But then most people don’t have experiences this ordered, so finding myself with an ordered experience is, on your hypothesis, very surprising.”
One will feel surprised by winning a million dollar on the lottery too, but that doesn’t mean that it would be rational to assume that just because one won a million dollar on the lottery most people win a million dollar on the lottery.
Maybe most of us exist only for a fraction of a second, but in that case, what is there to lose by (probably falsely, but maybe maybe maybe correctly) assuming that we exist much longer than that, and living accordingly? There is potentially something to gain by assuming that, and nothing to lose, so it may very well be rational to assume that, even though it is very unlikely to be the case!
How much resources should you devote to the next day vs. the next month vs. the next year? If each additional second of existence is a vast improbability, for simplicity you may assume a few moments of existence, but no longer.
If, OTOH, once you live, say, 3 seconds, it’s as likely as not that you’ll live a few more years—there’s some sort of bimodality—then such a stance is justified. Bimodality would only work if there were some sort of theoretical justification.
If everything that can happen, happens (sooner or later) - which is assumed
there will be continuations (not necessarily at the same spot in spacetime, but somewhere) of whatever brief life I have for a few seconds or planck times now, and continuations of those continuations too, and so on, without an end, meaning I’m immortal, given that identity is not dependent on the survival of any particular atoms (as opposed to patterns in which atoms, any atoms, are arranged, anywhere). This means that what I achieve during the short existences that are most common in the universe will only be parts of what I will have achieved in the long run, when all those short existences are “put together” (or thought of as one continuous life). Therefore, I should care about what my life will be like in a few years, in a few centuries, in a few googol years, et cetera, together, that is, my whole infinitely long future, more than I should care about any one short existence at any one place in spacetime. If I can maximize my overall happiness over my infinite life only by accepting a huge lot of suffering for a hundred years beginning now, I should do just that (if I’m a rational egoist).
My life may very well consist of predominantly extremely short-lived Boltzmann-brains, but I don’t die just because these Boltzmann-brains die off one by one at a terrific rate.
Eliezer_Yudkowsky wrote: “I want to reply, “But then most people don’t have experiences this ordered, so finding myself with an ordered experience is, on your hypothesis, very surprising.”
One will feel surprised by winning a million dollar on the lottery too, but that doesn’t mean that it would be rational to assume that just because one won a million dollar on the lottery most people win a million dollar on the lottery.
Maybe most of us exist only for a fraction of a second, but in that case, what is there to lose by (probably falsely, but maybe maybe maybe correctly) assuming that we exist much longer than that, and living accordingly? There is potentially something to gain by assuming that, and nothing to lose, so it may very well be rational to assume that, even though it is very unlikely to be the case!
How much resources should you devote to the next day vs. the next month vs. the next year? If each additional second of existence is a vast improbability, for simplicity you may assume a few moments of existence, but no longer.
If, OTOH, once you live, say, 3 seconds, it’s as likely as not that you’ll live a few more years—there’s some sort of bimodality—then such a stance is justified. Bimodality would only work if there were some sort of theoretical justification.
If everything that can happen, happens (sooner or later) - which is assumed
there will be continuations (not necessarily at the same spot in spacetime, but somewhere) of whatever brief life I have for a few seconds or planck times now, and continuations of those continuations too, and so on, without an end, meaning I’m immortal, given that identity is not dependent on the survival of any particular atoms (as opposed to patterns in which atoms, any atoms, are arranged, anywhere). This means that what I achieve during the short existences that are most common in the universe will only be parts of what I will have achieved in the long run, when all those short existences are “put together” (or thought of as one continuous life). Therefore, I should care about what my life will be like in a few years, in a few centuries, in a few googol years, et cetera, together, that is, my whole infinitely long future, more than I should care about any one short existence at any one place in spacetime. If I can maximize my overall happiness over my infinite life only by accepting a huge lot of suffering for a hundred years beginning now, I should do just that (if I’m a rational egoist).
My life may very well consist of predominantly extremely short-lived Boltzmann-brains, but I don’t die just because these Boltzmann-brains die off one by one at a terrific rate.
I said “how much” not “if”. My point is that you should care vastly more about the next few seconds then a few years from now.