Rule 1: assume all judgments that things are [ETA: or are] not of equal value are due to motivated thinking by people writing their bottom line according to a weighted primeval in-group/out-group equation, and in response one should compensate along necessary opposite vectors [ETA: or find an ingroup member to inform you about their group].
Rule 2: Rule 1 does not apply to the extent the in-group in question is constructed around complying with these rules.
Note 1: There will not necessarily be unique solutions to these rules, for example, evidence that men and women think differently in important ways can either be dismissed entirely or have its interpretation arranged so that the tasks women are better at are more important.
Note 2: These rules only apply to conclusions in line with primeval in-group/out-group thinking, for example, no one cares if their non-African scientists discover that all modern non-Africans are descended from Neanderthals, because the in-group is allowed to say things that some perceived moral systems would see as making them inferior. The opposite would have been a different situation.
Note 3: Any conclusion that results from compensating more than one did may be honestly disagreed with; the presence of honest disagreement marks the system as tolerant and makes those who apparently dishonestly disagree beyond the pale and not even worth arguing with. Any conclusion at variance with the rules system due to its compensating significantly less isn’t just wrong, but evidence of primitive rationalization and/or moral failure, in accordance with Rule 1, and its advocates are different in kind from those merely disagreed with,.
[ETA: Note 4: These rules are recursive. Whether someone is valuing things as equal (or not) is to be judged by an interpreter of the rules according to the rules.
These rules constitute a black box with which one can discover socially respectable positions without understanding facts and apparently underlying issues. Information about such facts may distract from unbiased use of the black box, and result in unacceptable opinions.]
Thinking long and hard about this formulation, I think it is equivalent to a great extent to my own approach on the rules, which I constructed mostly in status language. I should admonish myself for laziness, because that key part can be talked about in the abstract (I think) and I should have taken the time to write down a post on what could be talked about.
There will not necessarily be unique solutions to these rules, for example, evidence that men and women think differently in important ways can either be dismissed entirely or have its interpretation arranged so that the tasks women are better at are more important
But some solutions will be more popular than others. And choosing a very unpopular solution may get you into as much trouble as not following the core rule set at all. Analysis of why some gain greater popularity in various circles is where I think the meat lies.To give an example, rule 2 is often applied to rationalize adaptive behaviour (that often dosen’t even arise from the human minds ability to deceive itself for gain, but from mere selection effects and memetic evolution), so that one can continue to espouse principles and opinions that signal good things about you because of the handicap principle. So tagging on what basically amounts to a simple model of moral fashion improves predictive power noticeably and I am sure you and others can think of other such useful additions to the black box replacement of contemporary Western ideological thought as well.
Rule 1: assume all judgments that things are [ETA: or are] not of equal value are due to motivated thinking by people writing their bottom line according to a weighted primeval in-group/out-group equation, and in response one should compensate along necessary opposite vectors [ETA: or find an ingroup member to inform you about their group].
Rule 2: Rule 1 does not apply to the extent the in-group in question is constructed around complying with these rules.
Note 1: There will not necessarily be unique solutions to these rules, for example, evidence that men and women think differently in important ways can either be dismissed entirely or have its interpretation arranged so that the tasks women are better at are more important.
Note 2: These rules only apply to conclusions in line with primeval in-group/out-group thinking, for example, no one cares if their non-African scientists discover that all modern non-Africans are descended from Neanderthals, because the in-group is allowed to say things that some perceived moral systems would see as making them inferior. The opposite would have been a different situation.
Note 3: Any conclusion that results from compensating more than one did may be honestly disagreed with; the presence of honest disagreement marks the system as tolerant and makes those who apparently dishonestly disagree beyond the pale and not even worth arguing with. Any conclusion at variance with the rules system due to its compensating significantly less isn’t just wrong, but evidence of primitive rationalization and/or moral failure, in accordance with Rule 1, and its advocates are different in kind from those merely disagreed with,.
[ETA: Note 4: These rules are recursive. Whether someone is valuing things as equal (or not) is to be judged by an interpreter of the rules according to the rules.
These rules constitute a black box with which one can discover socially respectable positions without understanding facts and apparently underlying issues. Information about such facts may distract from unbiased use of the black box, and result in unacceptable opinions.]
Seems a good take. Up voted!
Thinking long and hard about this formulation, I think it is equivalent to a great extent to my own approach on the rules, which I constructed mostly in status language. I should admonish myself for laziness, because that key part can be talked about in the abstract (I think) and I should have taken the time to write down a post on what could be talked about.
But some solutions will be more popular than others. And choosing a very unpopular solution may get you into as much trouble as not following the core rule set at all. Analysis of why some gain greater popularity in various circles is where I think the meat lies.To give an example, rule 2 is often applied to rationalize adaptive behaviour (that often dosen’t even arise from the human minds ability to deceive itself for gain, but from mere selection effects and memetic evolution), so that one can continue to espouse principles and opinions that signal good things about you because of the handicap principle. So tagging on what basically amounts to a simple model of moral fashion improves predictive power noticeably and I am sure you and others can think of other such useful additions to the black box replacement of contemporary Western ideological thought as well.