I argue that computation is fuzzy, it’s a property of our map of a system rather than the territory.
This is false. Everything exists in the territory to the extent to which it can interact with us. While different models can output a different answer as to which computation something runs, that doesn’t mean the computation isn’t real (or, even, that no computation is real). The computation is real in the sense of it influencing our sense impressions (I can observe my computer running a specific computation, for example). Someone else, whose model doesn’t return “yes” to the question whether my computer runs a particular computation will then have to explain my reports of my sense impressions (why does this person claim their computer runs Windows, when I’m predicting it runs CP/M?), and they will have to either change their model, or make systematically incorrect predictions about my utterances.
In this way, every computation that can be ascribed to a physical system is intersubjectively real, which is the only kind of reality there could, in principle, be.
(Philosophical zombies, by the way, don’t refer to functional isomorphs, but to physical duplicates, so even if you lost your consciousness after having your brain converted, it wouldn’t turn you into a philosophical zombie.)
Could any device ever run such simulations quickly enough (so as to keep up with the pace of the biological neurons) on a chip small enough (so as to fit in amongst the biological neurons)?
In principle, yes. The upper physical limit for the amount of computation per kg of material per second is incredibly high.
Following this to its logical conclusion: when it comes down to actually designing these chips, a designer may end up discovering that the only way to reproduce all of the relevant in/out behavior of a neuron, is just to build a neuron!
This is false. It’s known that any subset of the universe can be simulated on a classical computer to an arbitrary precision.
The non-functionalist audience is also not obliged to trust the introspective reports at intermediate stages.
This introduces a bizarre disconnect between your beliefs about your qualia, and the qualia themselves. Imagine: It would be possible, for example, that you believe you’re in pain, and act in all ways as if you’re in pain, but actually, you’re not in pain.
Whatever I denote by “qualia,” it certainly doesn’t have this extremely bizarre property.
But since we’re interested in the phenomenal texture of that experience, we’re left with the question: how can we assume that octopus pain and human pain have the same quality?
Because then, the functional properties of a quale and the quale itself would be synchronized only in Homo sapiens. Other species (like octopus) might have qualia, but since they’re made of different matter, they (the non-computationalist would argue) certainly have a different quality, so while they funtionally behave the same way, the quale itself is different. This would introduce a bizarre desynchronization between behavior and qualia, that just happens to match for Homo sapiens.
(This isn’t something that I ever thought would be written in net-upvoted posts about on LessWrong, let alone ending in a sequence. Identity is necessarily in the pattern, and there is no reason to think the meat-parts of the pattern are necessary in addition to the computation-parts.)
This is false. Everything exists in the territory to the extent to which it can interact with us. While different models can output a different answer as to which computation something runs, that doesn’t mean the computation isn’t real (or, even, that no computation is real). The computation is real in the sense of it influencing our sense impressions (I can observe my computer running a specific computation, for example). Someone else, whose model doesn’t return “yes” to the question whether my computer runs a particular computation will then have to explain my reports of my sense impressions (why does this person claim their computer runs Windows, when I’m predicting it runs CP/M?), and they will have to either change their model, or make systematically incorrect predictions about my utterances.
In this way, every computation that can be ascribed to a physical system is intersubjectively real, which is the only kind of reality there could, in principle, be.
(Philosophical zombies, by the way, don’t refer to functional isomorphs, but to physical duplicates, so even if you lost your consciousness after having your brain converted, it wouldn’t turn you into a philosophical zombie.)
In principle, yes. The upper physical limit for the amount of computation per kg of material per second is incredibly high.
This is false. It’s known that any subset of the universe can be simulated on a classical computer to an arbitrary precision.
This introduces a bizarre disconnect between your beliefs about your qualia, and the qualia themselves. Imagine: It would be possible, for example, that you believe you’re in pain, and act in all ways as if you’re in pain, but actually, you’re not in pain.
Whatever I denote by “qualia,” it certainly doesn’t have this extremely bizarre property.
Because then, the functional properties of a quale and the quale itself would be synchronized only in Homo sapiens. Other species (like octopus) might have qualia, but since they’re made of different matter, they (the non-computationalist would argue) certainly have a different quality, so while they funtionally behave the same way, the quale itself is different. This would introduce a bizarre desynchronization between behavior and qualia, that just happens to match for Homo sapiens.
(This isn’t something that I ever thought would be written in net-upvoted posts about on LessWrong, let alone ending in a sequence. Identity is necessarily in the pattern, and there is no reason to think the meat-parts of the pattern are necessary in addition to the computation-parts.)