You’re using ‘bridging law’ differently from I was, so let me rephrase.
To explain subjective experience, you need bridging-laws-as-you-define-them. But it could be that consciousness is functional and the bridging laws are implicit in the description of the universe, rather than explicit. Differently put, the bridging laws follow as a logical consequences of how the remaining universe is defined, rather than being an additional degree of freedom.[1]
In that case, since bridging laws do not add to the length of the program,[2] Solomonoff Induction will favor a universe in which they’re the same for everyone, since this is what happens by default (you’d have a hard time imagining that bridging laws follow by logical necessity but are different for different people). In fact, there’s a sense in which the program that SI finds is the same as the program SI would find for an illusionist universe; the difference is just about whether you think this program implies the existence of implicit bridging laws. But in neither cases is there an explicit set of bridging laws that add to the length of the program.
Most of Eliezer’s anti zombie sequence, especially Zombies Redacted can be viewed as an argument for bridging laws being implicit rather than explicit. He phrases this as “consciousness happens within physics” in that post.
Also arguable but something I feel very strongly about; I have an unpublished post where I argue at length that and why logical implications shouldn’t increase program length in Solomonoff Induction.
You’re using ‘bridging law’ differently from I was, so let me rephrase.
To explain subjective experience, you need bridging-laws-as-you-define-them. But it could be that consciousness is functional and the bridging laws are implicit in the description of the universe, rather than explicit. Differently put, the bridging laws follow as a logical consequences of how the remaining universe is defined, rather than being an additional degree of freedom.[1]
In that case, since bridging laws do not add to the length of the program,[2] Solomonoff Induction will favor a universe in which they’re the same for everyone, since this is what happens by default (you’d have a hard time imagining that bridging laws follow by logical necessity but are different for different people). In fact, there’s a sense in which the program that SI finds is the same as the program SI would find for an illusionist universe; the difference is just about whether you think this program implies the existence of implicit bridging laws. But in neither cases is there an explicit set of bridging laws that add to the length of the program.
Most of Eliezer’s anti zombie sequence, especially Zombies Redacted can be viewed as an argument for bridging laws being implicit rather than explicit. He phrases this as “consciousness happens within physics” in that post.
Also arguable but something I feel very strongly about; I have an unpublished post where I argue at length that and why logical implications shouldn’t increase program length in Solomonoff Induction.