Here we have the problem that reasonable arguments and the self-evident truth of rationality is often only clear among people who already agree on everything of substance. People who agree can confidently assert the rationality and reasonableness of their arguments to those who have the exactly same perspective. So, for example, you have educated people like William F. Buckley, Jr. explaining that there is more evidence of the resurrection of Jesus Christ than that Abraham Lincoln gave the Emancipation Proclamation.
The correct explanation of the described phenomenon is that people often have different ideas about what is reasonable. Khan’s interpretation “reason is suspect” appears either as if he doesn’t want to prefer his own definition of reason over, say, a religious fundamentalist definition, or as if he practically identifies reason with “everything people call such”. Which doesn’t seem reasonable according to my definition of reason.
as if he practically identifies reason with “everything people call such”.
So you’re asserting that there are two kinds of people, those that call reason “reason”, and those that mistakenly call something else “reason”. Keep in mind that people in the second category believe that they belong to the first. So how do you know you don’t belong to the second category?
I am asserting that different people attach the label “reason” to different concepts, nothing else. I certainly don’t assert existence of two categories; if you push me hard to categorise, I would rather admit 6 billion categories as no two people would probably completely agree on definition of “reason”. I have said nothing about myself being right in the use of “reason” and others being “mistaken”.
Is there a way how to formulate the idea that different people may use “reason” differently which would not appear to you as implicit sorting of those interpretations into two categories, suspect and non-suspect? Note that although I have used the word “suspect”, it was in a paraphrase of Khan’s position, not referring to the interpretations of “reason”.
Is there a way how to formulate the idea that different people may use “reason” differently which would not appear to you as implicit sorting of those interpretations into two categories, suspect and non-suspect?
Only if you’re willing to deny the existence of an objective reality.
The correct explanation of the described phenomenon is that people often have different ideas about what is reasonable. Khan’s interpretation “reason is suspect” appears either as if he doesn’t want to prefer his own definition of reason over, say, a religious fundamentalist definition, or as if he practically identifies reason with “everything people call such”. Which doesn’t seem reasonable according to my definition of reason.
So you’re asserting that there are two kinds of people, those that call reason “reason”, and those that mistakenly call something else “reason”. Keep in mind that people in the second category believe that they belong to the first. So how do you know you don’t belong to the second category?
I am asserting that different people attach the label “reason” to different concepts, nothing else. I certainly don’t assert existence of two categories; if you push me hard to categorise, I would rather admit 6 billion categories as no two people would probably completely agree on definition of “reason”. I have said nothing about myself being right in the use of “reason” and others being “mistaken”.
And implicitly sorting those concepts into two categories, those that are suspect and those that aren’t.
Is there a way how to formulate the idea that different people may use “reason” differently which would not appear to you as implicit sorting of those interpretations into two categories, suspect and non-suspect? Note that although I have used the word “suspect”, it was in a paraphrase of Khan’s position, not referring to the interpretations of “reason”.
Only if you’re willing to deny the existence of an objective reality.