This whole point may reflect collective confusion surrounding the term “utility.”
I do not presently have a coefficient in my utility function attached to John Doe, who is a mechanic in Des Moines (I’m assuming). I know nothing about him, and whatever happens to him does not affect my experience of happiness in the slightest. I wish him well, but it would make little sense to say he is reflected in my utility function. I would agree that, ceteris paribus, the better off he is, the better, but (particularly since I won’t know it), this doesn’t really weigh in my experience of life.
On the other hand, if you asked me if I would rather him die if meant I got a thousand dollars, I’d have to turn down the offer. I care about his utility in the abstract, even if it doesn’t actually affect my happiness.
There’s a relevant distinction between abstract collective utility and personally experienced utility. The human mind is not powerful enough to comprehend true, complete, abstract utility, and if it was you’d probably become terminally depressed. One can believe in the importance of maximizing abstract utility while not actually experiencing it. When Omega offers to double our utility, we think that means something we experience, and we don’t experience the abstract utility of the entire planet. I believe that this distinction gets confused, leading to this post feeling contrary to intuition.
On which note, we really don’t know what total utility looks like—it’s too complex. So the world gets destroyed or total utility gets doubled 50-50 bet is not evaluable by the individual because we don’t know how to evaluate the disutility of the world being destroyed, other than we’d rather not risk it.
This is all made that much more painful by the fact that reason alone cannot say which is preferable, the scratching of my finger or the destruction of the world. I think Hume may have beaten us to this.
When Omega offers to double our utility, we think that means something we experience, and we don’t experience the abstract utility of the entire planet. I believe that this distinction gets confused, leading to this post feeling contrary to intuition.
Actually, if you think of the paradox below in these terms, as being one where you’re offered vague, unmeasurable rewards, it ceases to be a paradox. It’s only a paradox because we’ve abstracted those confusing issues away.
It is a puzzle that is meant to get at the question of whether our mathematical models of rationality are correct. If you’re not talking about mathematical models, you’re having a different conversation.
This whole point may reflect collective confusion surrounding the term “utility.”
I do not presently have a coefficient in my utility function attached to John Doe, who is a mechanic in Des Moines (I’m assuming). I know nothing about him, and whatever happens to him does not affect my experience of happiness in the slightest. I wish him well, but it would make little sense to say he is reflected in my utility function. I would agree that, ceteris paribus, the better off he is, the better, but (particularly since I won’t know it), this doesn’t really weigh in my experience of life.
On the other hand, if you asked me if I would rather him die if meant I got a thousand dollars, I’d have to turn down the offer. I care about his utility in the abstract, even if it doesn’t actually affect my happiness.
There’s a relevant distinction between abstract collective utility and personally experienced utility. The human mind is not powerful enough to comprehend true, complete, abstract utility, and if it was you’d probably become terminally depressed. One can believe in the importance of maximizing abstract utility while not actually experiencing it. When Omega offers to double our utility, we think that means something we experience, and we don’t experience the abstract utility of the entire planet. I believe that this distinction gets confused, leading to this post feeling contrary to intuition.
On which note, we really don’t know what total utility looks like—it’s too complex. So the world gets destroyed or total utility gets doubled 50-50 bet is not evaluable by the individual because we don’t know how to evaluate the disutility of the world being destroyed, other than we’d rather not risk it.
This is all made that much more painful by the fact that reason alone cannot say which is preferable, the scratching of my finger or the destruction of the world. I think Hume may have beaten us to this.
Actually, if you think of the paradox below in these terms, as being one where you’re offered vague, unmeasurable rewards, it ceases to be a paradox. It’s only a paradox because we’ve abstracted those confusing issues away.
It is a puzzle that is meant to get at the question of whether our mathematical models of rationality are correct. If you’re not talking about mathematical models, you’re having a different conversation.