The first step towards a society in which ridiculous beliefs are acknowledged to be ridiculous, is to stop acting as if these beliefs aren’t ridiculous. The point of ridicule is first to make those who hold ridiculous beliefs feel ashamed or at least uncomfortable, and second to help make rationalists feel the appropriate emotion when dealing with such extremes of irrationality.
Perhaps it seems tautologous that ridicule is the best way to deal with the ridiculous. So I’m tabooing the word “ridiculous”. What do you mean by it?
Does it just mean “crazy” in the sense in which Eliezer uses it? Then, for what reason do you believe that ridicule (e.g., sarcasm and contemptuous scorn) is the best way to achieve your end goal?
If I read “crazy” where you wrote “ridiculous”, then your claim is that the first step towards a society in which crazy beliefs are acknowledged to be crazy is to heap scorn and contempt on them. But this is far from obvious. How do you make this argument without relying on the verbal similarity between the words “ridiculous” and “ridicule”?
Does it just mean “crazy” in the sense in which Eliezer uses it?
Pretty much.
If I read “crazy” where you wrote “ridiculous”, then your claim is that the first step towards a society in which crazy beliefs are acknowledged to be crazy is to heap scorn and contempt on them.
Well, not in all situations, and it doesn’t necessarily have to be scorn and contempt, it could also be incredulity (“You believe WHAT?!”), for example. The point is to shock people out of their usual way of thinking, and that sometimes requires a bit of finesse. But a lot of the time scorn and contempt is necessary, yes.
But this is far from obvious. How do you make this argument without relying on the verbal similarity between the words “ridiculous” and “ridicule”?
The idea is that faith and self-deception are bad, while truth and rationality are good. So we reward good behavior and punish bad behavior.
How did the gay movement make so much progress in so little time? Was it by engaging in gentle, respectful debate with their opponents? Of course not. They just pointed out the obvious repeatedly: Those people are intolerant bigots. It was obvious, and yet somehow it hadn’t really entered public consciousness, even among those who had the kind of morality that should have lead them to support gay rights. Now that it has, most of those whom we now call homophobes haven’t suddenly become enlightened, but they’ve been forced to dilute their language if not their beliefs if they want to be part of the public sphere.
There’s more than that to the gay movement’s accomplishments, but heaping scorn and contempt on their opponents is definitely a big part of it. If it worked that movement, why not for this one?
The idea is that faith and self-deception are bad, while truth and rationality are good. So we reward good behavior and punish bad behavior.
There’s an implicit premise here that the punishment works to discourage the bad behavior. Your argument for this premise is to make an analogy with the gay-rights movement:
How did the gay movement make so much progress in so little time? Was it by engaging in gentle, respectful debate with their opponents? Of course not. They just pointed out the obvious repeatedly: Those people are intolerant bigots.
That is not my sense of how the gay-rights movement succeeded at all. As I see it, they did it by gaining the sympathy of enough of the right people. This, in turn, they did by making their humanity evident. And this they did by having high-status, sympathetic representatives.
Now, once your group is already high-status, you can use scorn to squelch opposition. If you’re high-status, people will want to affiliate with you, and they’ll read your scorn as a signal that they can affiliate with you by helping to squelch your opposition.
Personally, I’d say that that trick is a dishonest manipulation, because it’s not truth-tracking. It depends only on having high status, not on being right. But, more pragmatically, it only works if you already have the high status. Otherwise, it backfires. People read your scorn as a signal to affiliate with your opponents.
Before homosexuals had sufficiently high status, any scorn they showed hampered their progress. But I grant that they eventually gained enough status so that the scorn trick could work. Sam Harris does not appear to me to have reached that level.
That is not my sense of how the gay-rights movement succeeded at all. As I see it, they did it by gaining the sympathy of enough of the right people. This, in turn, they did by making their humanity evident. And this they did by having high-status, sympathetic representatives.
Now, once your group is already high-status, you can use scorn to squelch opposition. If you’re high-status, people will want to affiliate with you, and they’ll read your scorn as a signal that they can affiliate with you by helping to squelch your opposition.
This may be true, but I don’t think the gay movement waited to start expressing their scorn for homophobia until after they were high status. Are you saying that before the gay movement was high status, most of its representatives acted like homophobia was simply an opinion with which they disagreed, but which they respected nonetheless?
My impression is that portraying homophobia as something contemptible played an important part in obtaining this high status. Hell, just coming up with the word ‘homophobia’ (which was brilliant) helped a lot, and that was done a few decades ago.
Anyway, there’s another reason why treating religious beliefs like they’re crazy is a good thing: Religious beliefs are, indeed, crazy. I don’t see how this fact can ever be acknowledged by the rest of humanity if no one actually acts like it’s true, even those who accept it!
Are you saying that before the gay movement was high status, most of its representatives acted like homophobia was simply an opinion with which they disagreed, but which they respected nonetheless?
No, I am saying that whatever displays of scorn they made didn’t help them gain the sympathy of non-homosexuals, and probably hurt them.
Religious beliefs are, indeed, crazy. I don’t see how this fact can ever be acknowledged by the rest of humanity if no one actually acts like it’s true, even those who accept it!
I agree that we should act as though religious beliefs are crazy (in Eliezer’s sense of the word). The question is, what does it mean to act that way? That is, what is the most productive response to crazy beliefs? I expect that it’s not generally contempt.
No, I am saying that whatever displays of scorn they made didn’t help them gain the sympathy of non-homosexuals, and probably hurt them.
It may not have gotten them sympathy, but I think labeling the opposing view as bigotry and a phobia could easily have gotten them a higher status, even in the early days of the movement.
Honestly though, I have no idea where to find the information we need to settle this disagreement.
I agree that we should act as though religious beliefs are crazy (in Eliezer’s sense of the word). The question is, what does it mean to act that way?
What I mean is that our reaction to someone who says, “I believe that Jesus is the son of God” should be similar to our reaction to someone who says, “I believe aliens are trying to kidnap me”.
The reaction can be incredulity, or amusement, or contempt, or something else, anything that doesn’t communicate the impression that you think it’s perfectly (or mostly) OK to be deluded in such a fashion.
Honestly though, I have no idea where to find the information we need to settle this disagreement.
That’s an important question, but one for which I have no answer.
I agree that we should act as though religious beliefs are crazy (in Eliezer’s sense of the word). The question is, what does it mean to act that way?
What I mean is that our reaction to someone who says, “I believe that Jesus is the son of God” should be similar to our reaction to someone who says, “I believe aliens are trying to kidnap me”.
Okay, just so long as we agree that “what it means to act as though a belief is crazy” isn’t something that you ought to define however you like. (As though you were to argue “It’s ridiculous. Therefore, by definition, I should ridicule it.”) The proper way to act is not something you can determine just by analyzing what “crazy” means, or just by establishing that it’s not okay to have crazy beliefs. The proper way to act is determined by what will in fact change the world into a state more like it ought to be.
If you’re right about the history of the acceptance of homosexuality, then that is some evidence in favor of your position.
the verbal similarity between the words “ridiculous” and “ridicule”?
It’s not just verbal similarity—one is derived from the other. It indeed seems merely definitional that the ridiculous ought to be ridiculed, though not necessarily that it is ‘the best’ way of dealing with it.
There’s some equivocation here. “Ridiculous” can mean, as the etymology would suggest, “that which should be ridiculed”, or it can mean “not sensible”. In the latter case, the ridiculous should not necessarily be ridiculed.
Perhaps it seems tautologous that ridicule is the best way to deal with the ridiculous. So I’m tabooing the word “ridiculous”. What do you mean by it?
Does it just mean “crazy” in the sense in which Eliezer uses it? Then, for what reason do you believe that ridicule (e.g., sarcasm and contemptuous scorn) is the best way to achieve your end goal?
If I read “crazy” where you wrote “ridiculous”, then your claim is that the first step towards a society in which crazy beliefs are acknowledged to be crazy is to heap scorn and contempt on them. But this is far from obvious. How do you make this argument without relying on the verbal similarity between the words “ridiculous” and “ridicule”?
Pretty much.
Well, not in all situations, and it doesn’t necessarily have to be scorn and contempt, it could also be incredulity (“You believe WHAT?!”), for example. The point is to shock people out of their usual way of thinking, and that sometimes requires a bit of finesse. But a lot of the time scorn and contempt is necessary, yes.
The idea is that faith and self-deception are bad, while truth and rationality are good. So we reward good behavior and punish bad behavior.
How did the gay movement make so much progress in so little time? Was it by engaging in gentle, respectful debate with their opponents? Of course not. They just pointed out the obvious repeatedly: Those people are intolerant bigots. It was obvious, and yet somehow it hadn’t really entered public consciousness, even among those who had the kind of morality that should have lead them to support gay rights. Now that it has, most of those whom we now call homophobes haven’t suddenly become enlightened, but they’ve been forced to dilute their language if not their beliefs if they want to be part of the public sphere.
There’s more than that to the gay movement’s accomplishments, but heaping scorn and contempt on their opponents is definitely a big part of it. If it worked that movement, why not for this one?
There’s an implicit premise here that the punishment works to discourage the bad behavior. Your argument for this premise is to make an analogy with the gay-rights movement:
That is not my sense of how the gay-rights movement succeeded at all. As I see it, they did it by gaining the sympathy of enough of the right people. This, in turn, they did by making their humanity evident. And this they did by having high-status, sympathetic representatives.
Now, once your group is already high-status, you can use scorn to squelch opposition. If you’re high-status, people will want to affiliate with you, and they’ll read your scorn as a signal that they can affiliate with you by helping to squelch your opposition.
Personally, I’d say that that trick is a dishonest manipulation, because it’s not truth-tracking. It depends only on having high status, not on being right. But, more pragmatically, it only works if you already have the high status. Otherwise, it backfires. People read your scorn as a signal to affiliate with your opponents.
Before homosexuals had sufficiently high status, any scorn they showed hampered their progress. But I grant that they eventually gained enough status so that the scorn trick could work. Sam Harris does not appear to me to have reached that level.
This may be true, but I don’t think the gay movement waited to start expressing their scorn for homophobia until after they were high status. Are you saying that before the gay movement was high status, most of its representatives acted like homophobia was simply an opinion with which they disagreed, but which they respected nonetheless?
My impression is that portraying homophobia as something contemptible played an important part in obtaining this high status. Hell, just coming up with the word ‘homophobia’ (which was brilliant) helped a lot, and that was done a few decades ago.
Anyway, there’s another reason why treating religious beliefs like they’re crazy is a good thing: Religious beliefs are, indeed, crazy. I don’t see how this fact can ever be acknowledged by the rest of humanity if no one actually acts like it’s true, even those who accept it!
No, I am saying that whatever displays of scorn they made didn’t help them gain the sympathy of non-homosexuals, and probably hurt them.
I agree that we should act as though religious beliefs are crazy (in Eliezer’s sense of the word). The question is, what does it mean to act that way? That is, what is the most productive response to crazy beliefs? I expect that it’s not generally contempt.
It may not have gotten them sympathy, but I think labeling the opposing view as bigotry and a phobia could easily have gotten them a higher status, even in the early days of the movement.
Honestly though, I have no idea where to find the information we need to settle this disagreement.
What I mean is that our reaction to someone who says, “I believe that Jesus is the son of God” should be similar to our reaction to someone who says, “I believe aliens are trying to kidnap me”.
The reaction can be incredulity, or amusement, or contempt, or something else, anything that doesn’t communicate the impression that you think it’s perfectly (or mostly) OK to be deluded in such a fashion.
That’s an important question, but one for which I have no answer.
Okay, just so long as we agree that “what it means to act as though a belief is crazy” isn’t something that you ought to define however you like. (As though you were to argue “It’s ridiculous. Therefore, by definition, I should ridicule it.”) The proper way to act is not something you can determine just by analyzing what “crazy” means, or just by establishing that it’s not okay to have crazy beliefs. The proper way to act is determined by what will in fact change the world into a state more like it ought to be.
If you’re right about the history of the acceptance of homosexuality, then that is some evidence in favor of your position.
It’s not just verbal similarity—one is derived from the other. It indeed seems merely definitional that the ridiculous ought to be ridiculed, though not necessarily that it is ‘the best’ way of dealing with it.
Arguments from etymology are not normative.
There’s some equivocation here. “Ridiculous” can mean, as the etymology would suggest, “that which should be ridiculed”, or it can mean “not sensible”. In the latter case, the ridiculous should not necessarily be ridiculed.