as robin has pointed out on numerous occasions, in many situations it is in our best interest to believe, or profess to believe, things that are false. because we cannot deceive others very well, and because we are penalized for lying about our beliefs, it is often in our best interest to not know how to believe things more likely to be true. refusing to believe popular lies forces you to either lie continually or to constantly risk your relative status within a potentially useful affiliative network by professing contrarian beliefs or, almost as bad, no beliefs at all. you’re better off if you only apply ″epistemic rationality techniques″ within domains where true beliefs are more frequently or largely rewarded, i.e., where they lead to winning strategies.
trying to suppress or correct your unconscious judgments (often) requires willpower. indiscriminately applying ″epistemic rationality techniques″ may have the unintended consequence of draining your willpower more quickly (and needlessly).
as robin has pointed out on numerous occasions, in many situations it is in our best interest to believe, or profess to believe, things that are false. because we cannot deceive others very well, and because we are penalized for lying about our beliefs, it is often in our best interest to not know how to believe things more likely to be true. refusing to believe popular lies forces you to either lie continually or to constantly risk your relative status within a potentially useful affiliative network by professing contrarian beliefs or, almost as bad, no beliefs at all. you’re better off if you only apply ″epistemic rationality techniques″ within domains where true beliefs are more frequently or largely rewarded, i.e., where they lead to winning strategies.
trying to suppress or correct your unconscious judgments (often) requires willpower. indiscriminately applying ″epistemic rationality techniques″ may have the unintended consequence of draining your willpower more quickly (and needlessly).